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Abstract

In the mid-1970s, state courts began to interpret state constitutions independently
of the federal constitution in a way that provided greater protection for individual rights
at the state versus federal level. Scholars have generally attributed the rise of this
movement, known as state constitutionalism, to the actions and scholarship of judges and
point to the cause as a fear that the Burger court would rollback Warren court era
protections for individual rights. In reality, the concept of state constitutionalism had
been present throughout the 1950s-1970s period of state constitutional revision and was
deeply influenced by concerns over the status of the federal system. Montana’s 1972
Constitutional Convention illustrates the role that constitutional revision had in the
subsequent adoption of state constitutionalism. In particular, the creation, adoption, and
interpretation of two provisions—the privacy and dignity clauses—shows that the public
was engaged in a conscious decision to go beyond the federal protections for individual
rights. Montana’s experience suggests that further research is needed in order for scholars
to fully understand the rise and adoption of state constitutionalism.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1972 Montana voters narrowly approved a new constitution to replace the
state’s original 1889 foundational document. This new constitution contained an
expanded “Declaration of Rights,” which many scholars argue provides greater
protection for individual rights than any other constitution in the United States, including
the federal document. Indeed, Montana’s “Declaration of Rights” guarantees seventeen
rights that are not explicitly protected by the U.S. Constitution.1 Delegates to the
Montana Constitutional Convention drafted this new document at the tail end of a twodecade-long period of state constitutional revision. Many of the other states that drafted
new constitutions during this era also adopted expansive individual-rights protections.
However, when discussing state constitutions and their level of protection of individual
rights, few scholars look at constitutional revision as a factor in the tendency of states to
go beyond the protections contained in the U.S. Constitution. Instead, scholars look to the
decisions and scholarship of judges who encouraged states to develop their own body of
constitutional law protecting individual rights.
In 1977 U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan wrote an article for the
Harvard Law Review that quickly became viewed as a seminal call to action: he
encouraged states to embrace a new way of approaching constitutional law and the
protection of individual rights from government action. In this article, Justice Brennan
discussed the revolution that had taken place in American law in general, and
1

Larry M. Elison and Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 1 – 23; Patricia A. Cain, "The Right to Privacy Under the
Montana Constitution: Sex and Intimacy, " Montana Law Review 64 (2003): 99 – 132; Justice James C.
Nelson, “Keynote Address: The Right to Privacy,” Montana Law Review 68 (2007): 260; Jeanne M.
Koester, “Equal Rights,” Montana Law Review 39 (1978): 238.
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constitutional law in particular since the 1920s. During this period lawyers and state
courts moved from viewing “state common law principles or state statutes” as the
primary body of law applicable to most legal disputes toward a growing reliance on
federal administrative, statutory, or constitutional law.2 Beginning in the 1920s and then
increasingly during the New Deal and Warren Court eras,3 the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down decisions that expanded the scope of the protections and liberties in the
federal Bill of Rights, including decisions that guaranteed these rights against state as
well as federal governmental action.4 These decisions revolutionized the relationship
between the federal and state governments by finding that the actions of state and local
governments were limited by the federal Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Utilizing this approach, the U.S. Supreme Court found school segregation
unconstitutional and developed a whole host of criminal procedural protections to state
police-suspect interactions such as the Miranda warning and protection from warrantless
searches.5
Once the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that provisions of the federal Bill of
Rights constrained the actions of state governments as well as the federal government,
many state courts began interpreting similar provisions in their state constitutions in the
2

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,”
Harvard Law Review 90, no. 3 (1977): 489 – 504, quote p. 489.
3
The New Deal era refers to the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1930s and 1940s and the Warren
Court era refers to the time period during which Earl Warren served as Chief Justice, 1953 – 1969.
4
For more on incorporation see, Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and The
Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States, 8thed. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003),
Chapter 3, in particular their discussion of Barron v. Baltimore (1833), The Fourteenth Amendment, The
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), and Gitlow v. New York (1925); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights:
Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), Part II; Raoul Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989).
5
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
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same way that the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted corresponding federal provisions.
For example, once the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited the use in court of evidence obtained illegally by the police, state
courts also began to interpret search and seizure clauses in their state constitutions as
prohibiting this practice.6
Justice Brennan lauded the rise of a strong federal constitutional jurisprudence
that guaranteed these protections and liberties “against encroachment by governmental
action at any level of our federal system.” However, he also expressed fear that states
were limiting their guarantees of individual liberties to those contained in the federal Bill
of Rights. “State constitutions, too,” Justice Brennan reminded his readers, “are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.” With these words, Brennan called upon
states to develop their own interpretations of their constitutions’ bills of rights. This
concept is known as “state constitutionalism,” the development of a system of
interpreting and applying a state constitution that does not rely solely on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution.7

6

The U.S. Supreme Court first applied the “exclusionary rule” (prohibiting the use in court of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure requirements) to federal
courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was not applied to the states via the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court reversed this ruling
and applied the exclusionary rule to both state and federal courts. For an analysis of the tendency for state
courts to interpret their state constitutions as applying the same protections as the U.S. Constitution see, G.
Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Porter, “State Constitutionalism and State Constitutional Law,” in “New
Developments in State Constitutional Law,” special issue, Publius 17, no. 1 (1987): 1 – 12. For an
overview of how Montana applied the exclusionary rule pre- and post-Mapp see, Melissa Harrison and
Peter Mickelson, “The Evolution of Montana’s Privacy-Enhanced Search and Seizure Analysis: A Return
to First Principles,” Montana Law Review 64 (2003): 245.
7
Brennan, “State Constitutions,” 490 – 491. Much of the literature, especially from the late 1970s
through the 1980s, discussing the independent interpretation of state constitutions, refers to this concept as
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Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, state courts embraced this concept
and many established independent grounds for interpreting their state constitutions and
their bills of rights. Since most states have bills of rights which contain similar provisions
to the federal protections, the adoption of state-specific interpretations of clauses
guaranteeing individual rights was particularly notable. Almost universally, legal scholars
point to Justice Brennan’s call to action, or to similar articles written by a handful of state
judges in the 1970s, as the source of the state constitutionalism movement.8 What most
of these scholars miss is that immediately prior to the rise of judicial support for state
constitutionalism, the United States had experienced one of the most active periods of
state constitutional revision in its history. At least twenty-three states, including
“new judicial federalism.” “New judicial federalism” specifically refers to state judges, often with a more
civil libertarian approach, attempting to revive the federalist system by interpreting a state constitution’s
bill of rights as providing more protection than similar provisions in the federal Bill. This thesis will utilize
the term “state constitutionalism,” which is a broader term that can encompass not only independent
interpretations of state bills of rights, but also other constitutional provisions which may have similar
corresponding clauses for two reasons: first, it is the author’s contention that this trend was not simply the
invention of state judges, which is the implication of the term “new judicial federalism,” and second,
because more recent literature often refers to the concept with the broader term “state constitutionalism.”
8
See, Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb, “Introduction: State Constitutions and American
Liberties” in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, eds. Paul Finkelman and Stephen
E. Gottlieb (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 1 – 16; Tarr and Porter, “State Constitutionalism”;
Alan G. Tarr, “The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism,” Publius 24, no. 2 (1994): 63 – 79;
Lawrence Friedman, “The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism,” Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 93, no. 28 (2000): 112 – 123; Michael G. Colantuono, “The Revision of
American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change,”
California Law Review 75, no. 4 (1987): 1473 – 1512, Colantuono uses the alternative phrase, “new
judicial federalism,” in reference to state constitutionalism; Robert M. Howard, Scott E. Graves, Julianne
Flowers, “State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties,” Law & Society
Review 40, no. 4 (2006): 845 – 870; Brennan, “State Constitutions.” The scholars who point to this Brennan
article, which grew out of an earlier speech, as the beginning of the new judicial federalism movement,
include Friedman, Tarr, and Colantuono; Collins, Galie, and Kincaid, and Finkelman and Gottlieb attribute
significant responsibility for the movement to Brennan but do not specifically pinpoint the beginning of the
movement to his 1977 article. While scholars appear to universally embrace the assumption that state
constitutionalism began in the mid-late 1970s because of judicial action, there is some disagreement about
the extent of state constitutionalism. Some scholars believe that the successes and extent of state
constitutionalism have been vastly over-hyped. For examples of these arguments see, Kermit L. Hall,
“Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitutions,” in Toward a Usable Past,
388 – 417, and James A. Gardner, “The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,” Michigan Law
Review 90 (February, 1992): 761 – 837.
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Montana, concluded efforts to completely or significantly revise their state constitutions
between 1955 and 1975; many others revised their constitutions piece-meal through
constitutional amendments during the same period.9
Accompanying this period of state constitutional revision were numerous
conversations about the purpose and scope of state constitutions and bills of rights and
their relationship to the federal Constitution. Underlying these conversations were real
concerns about the state of America’s federalist system, the growing power and influence
of federal law, and fears that the U.S. Supreme Court would not continue to protect
individual rights at the level reflected in its decisions of the 1950s and 1960s. These
concerns were noted by Justice Brennan and legal scholars as the motivation for state
constitutionalism. However, these discussions took place much earlier than most scholars
recognize, amidst the state constitutional revision of the 1950s through 1970s, and were
not limited to judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, but rather included legislators and the
general public. Indeed, the application of state constitutionalism grew directly out of this
period of state constitutional revision and reflected the desires of the citizens of the states
for a more balanced federalist system as well as period-specific values and beliefs about
fundamental rights.

9

On the major eras of state constitutional revision, see John J. Dinan, The American State
Constitutional Tradition (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009), chapter one; John J. Dinan, “’The
Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation’: The Development of State Constitutional Amendment
and Revision Procedures,” The Review of Politics 62, no. 4 (2000): 645 – 674; Albert L. Sturm, “The
Development of American State Constitutions,” in “State Constitutional Design in Federal Systems,”
special issue, Publius 12, no. 1 (1982): 57 – 98; Janice C. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision
Revisited,” in “New Developments in State Constitutional Law,” special issue, Publius 17, no. 1 (1987):
153 – 179; and John J. Carroll and Arthur English, “Traditions of State Constitution Making,” State &
Local Government Review 23, no. 3 (1991): 103 – 109.
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Since the 1970s Montana has been one of the states most active in the application
of state constitutionalism, and its experience with the rise and adoption of the concept
provides an opportunity for a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the state
constitutionalism movement in America. In 1972 Montana revised its constitution
through a public convention. The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention and the
“Declaration of Rights” it crafted (which legal scholars view as protecting individual
rights more stringently than “any state in this country” 10) show that state
constitutionalism was the result of era-specific, citizen-driven constitutional revision. In
Montana, state judges in the late 1970s and 1980s were able to interpret and apply the
state constitution independent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of
corresponding clauses in the federal Constitution because the citizen-driven constitutional
convention had discussed and drafted a constitution on independent grounds. The fact
that Montana’s convention took place during an era of state constitutional revision and
nation-wide conversations about the purpose of state constitutions suggests that state
constitutionalism throughout the nation was a result of constitutional revision as much as
the actions of state and federal judges.
In Montana a grassroots group of individuals consciously, and with the input of
the public, drafted a constitution that was intended to provide strong protections for
individual rights. These individuals were well-informed about and connected to the
constitutional revision activity that was occurring across the country. The debates and
adoption of two clauses in the 1972 Montana Constitution—the dignity clause and the
privacy clause— in combination with the public discussions regarding the Declaration of
10

Cain, "The Right to Privacy.”
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Rights in general, illustrate that the concept of state constitutionalism was widely
understood among the public and the delegates, and supported across ideological lines.
Further, the decision to embrace state constitutionalism reflected an awareness of
ongoing discussions across the country and was used as a tactic for bolstering state power
in the federal system as much as an attempt to maintain Warren Court-era protections for
individual rights. Montana’s constitutional convention and its embrace of state
constitutionalism demonstrate that Justice Brennan’s Harvard Law Review article was not
the beginning of state constitutionalism, but a call for state courts to increase their
participation in a movement that had already begun during the previous two decades of
constitutional revision.
This thesis will first explore the legal and political developments that led to state
constitutionalism as well as those that led to the Montana Constitutional Convention. It
will then establish that the concept of state constitutionalism was an integral aspect of
mid-century constitutional revision, that the delegates to the Montana Constitutional
Convention were aware of the concept of state constitutionalism, and that the Montana
public and media were familiar with the principle and urged the delegates to craft a
constitution that would go beyond federal protections. Next, the thesis will explore the
crafting and adoption of two provisions—the privacy clause and the dignity clause—in
the Montana constitution. These two clauses are unique to Montana, and guarantee rights
that are not explicitly included in the federal Constitution. The two provisions have been
lauded as providing the legal basis for the most far-reaching Montana Supreme Court
decisions that have been decided on independent state grounds. Finally, the thesis will
7

assess the role that the 1972 constitutional revision had on Montana’s adoption of state
constitutionalism and what this suggests for the history of state of constitutionalism
across the nation.

8

Chapter 2: Background
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Harvard Law Review article, American law,
especially in the arena of constitutional law, underwent a radical transformation during
the mid-twentieth century. This transformation began in the 1920s and reached its peak
during the Warren Court era. However, the basis for these changes can be traced back to
the post-Civil War era. Before the Civil War, the states and the federal government
generally had separate spheres of power and legal jurisdiction. Power over individual
liberties was almost solely in the hands of the states. Despite this well-settled division of
power, for almost a century lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and historians had engaged in
“lively disagreement” over whether the Bill of Rights served as a limitation on state
governments as well as the federal government. The Bill of Rights, consisting of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution, passed Congress in 1789 in order to fulfill the
promises made to ensure ratification of the Constitution by the states. During the drafting
and ratification process, James Madison—the bill’s primary author—unsuccessfully
attempted to include provisions that applied at least a portion of the bill to the states. In
the 1833 case, Barron v. Baltimore, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights
only limited the actions of the federal government, not those of states. This opinion
became “the law of the land” and, for the most part, left citizens unable to assert the
protections of the federal Bill of Rights against the actions of a state. 1

1

Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1989), 5 – 6; Chief Justice Marshall, Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833);
Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and The Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United
States, 8thed. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 36.
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Following the Civil War, Republican plans for Reconstruction faced a number of
challenges. The South was resistant, and it was unclear whether the Constitution and the
laws of the country gave Congress the power to reconstruct the South. In part to bolster
the legal authority for Reconstruction, Congress passed and the requisite number of states
ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery everywhere in the United States, and the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited denying a citizen the right to vote because of their race.
The Fourteenth Amendment was more complex and addressed a number of issues related
to the aftermath of the Civil War. The most significant provision, Section 1, guaranteed
citizenship to all persons born in the United States, in effect overturning the 1857 Dred
Scott Supreme Court decision, which ruled that black individuals born in America were
not and could never be citizens of the United States. It also prohibited states from
abridging “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” from depriving
“any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” or from denying “to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” All three amendments
empowered Congress to pass legislation for their enforcement and were intended, some
later argued, to provide the legal basis for legislation that would remedy the results of
slavery and persistent discrimination against African Americans.2
The exact intent of these amendments and the scope of their effects have been
widely debated, but it is clear that over time their effect was to increase the power of the
federal government. Legal historians have noted that the Reconstruction amendments

2

U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment; Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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changed the balance of power between the federal and state governments by providing a
legal basis for federal oversight of the states’ power in the areas of individual rights and
liberties.3 There are myriad ways in which the Civil War and Reconstruction altered the
American legal landscape, but for the purposes of exploring the relative power of the
federal government and the state governments in protecting individual rights, there are
two primary topics of importance: the increase in federal power brought about by the
Reconstruction amendments and the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied
the federal Bill of Rights to the states.
Since the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption there has been increased debate over
whether the framers of the Amendment intended it to be a vehicle for applying the federal
Bill of Rights to state actions, a concept referred to as incorporation.4 In part, this is due
to the lack of in-depth discussion in Congress regarding the scope of Section 1 of the
Amendment. According to legal scholar Jacobus tenBroek, the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted by Congress “at the very least, to make certain that that statutory plan [for
reconstruction] was constitutional, to remove doubts about the adequacy of the Thirteenth
Amendment to sustain it, and to place its substantive provisions in the Constitution
itself.”5

3

On the effect of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments on the American political
and legal system, see Jacobus tenBroek, “Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment,” California Law Review 39, no. 2
(June, 1951): 171 – 180; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1998), Part II; Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1986). Some scholars argue that the Reconstruction Amendments were not intended
to shift the balance of power as much as occurred during the twentieth century, see Charles Fairman, “The
Original Understanding,” Stanford Law Review 2, no. 1 (1949): 5 – 139; and Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment.
4
Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court, 36.
5
Jacobus tenBroek, “Thirteenth Amendment,” 203.
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As a result of this ambiguity regarding the framers’ intentions, the Supreme Court
ended up defining the extent of the due process and equal protection provisions and
exactly which “privileges or immunities” this clause sought to guarantee. Historian
Morton J. Horowitz has characterized this time period between the ratification of the
Reconstruction amendments and the early 1900s as a battle between competing legal
theories: “Classical Legal Thought” on the one hand, which “presumed that the existence
of decentralized political and economic institutions was the primary reason why America
had managed to preserve its freedom” and “Progressive Legal Thought” on the other,
which argued that the law impacted the lives of people in real ways and was intimately
connected to moral and political reasoning. The Reconstruction amendments could be
seen as a challenge to the beliefs of those who embraced Classical Legal Thought
because the framers of the amendments acknowledged a need for and provided a legal
basis for centralized oversight of individual rights and liberties.6
Supporters of Classical Legal Thought on the U.S. Supreme Court prevailed
during this era and rejected labor laws and other federal regulatory schemes. The Court’s
early decisions regarding the Reconstruction amendments followed this pattern of
denying expansive centralized authority.7 The Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse
Cases (1873), the first case in which the Court had to determine the scope of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, resulted in a narrow interpretation of the clause in question.
The Court rejected the idea that the Bill of Rights was applied to the states via the
6

Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 4.
7
Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial (Lawrence: University of
Kansas, 1998); tenBroek, “Thirteenth Amendment,” 209; Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the
Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), Part I: The Old Order.
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privileges or immunities clause of Section 1 and put forth a very narrow definition of
federal “privileges or immunities.”8
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Supreme Court
handed down a number of decisions that further defined the “due process” clause and
differentiated its requirements from those under the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment. This reaffirmed the belief that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights
could not be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.9
It was not until the 1920s, the case of Gitlow v. New York, that the Court began to
use the Fourteenth Amendment to extend some of the protections contained in the Bill of
Rights to individuals affected by state action.10 In Gitlow, in which the Court held that the
conviction of a Socialist for expounding potentially inciteful beliefs and materials was
not a violation of the First Amendment, Justice Sanford stated, “We…assume that
freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment … are
…protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States.”11
Once the majority of the Court had advanced the possibility of applying
protections contained within the Bill of Rights to the states, the Court as a whole and
individual justices began to develop a variety of incorporation theories.12 A major

8

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
10
Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court, 58.
11
Justice Sanford, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12
Legal scholars have identified three to five primary judicial theories of incorporation. According
to David O’Brien, justices of the Supreme Court have developed five recognized approaches to the concept
of incorporation: total incorporation, selective incorporation, fundamental fairness, total incorporation plus,
and selective incorporation plus. Henry Abraham and Barbara Perry recognize the first four as fully fleshed
9

13

change in the focus and philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court further encouraged the
process of incorporation. As legal scholar Paul Kens has established, prevailing legal
theories prior to 1937 led the Court to embrace the protection of property and reject many
attempts by the federal government to regulate the economy or society. In a sudden
about-face in 1937, well into the Great Depression, the Court began to uphold New Deal
programs, and the focus of the U.S. Supreme Court began to shift from protecting
property interests to protecting individual liberties.13 Political scientists Henry J.
Abraham and Barbara A. Perry have noted that whereas during the 1935 – 1936 Supreme
Court term two out of 160 decisions focused on individual liberties, “since 1937 the
overwhelming majority of judicial vetoes imposed upon the several states and almost all
of those against the national government have been invoked because they infringed
personal liberties” protected by the Bill of Rights.14
Following this trend, the post-1937 New Deal Court and the Warren Court slowly
continued to apply some of the protections of the Bill to the states. These protections
included the freedoms of speech and press, the free exercise of religion, and the right to
peaceable assembly. The Court applied these particular protections to the states because
the Court determined them to be included within the meaning of the due process clause of
out judicial theories, whereas Akhil Reed Amar argues, “three main approaches have dominated the
twentieth century debate”: fundamental fairness, total incorporation, and selective incorporation. For more
on these theories and the justices who advocated for them see, David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and
Politics: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 6th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2005), 2:309 – 318;
Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court, 95 – 100; and Amar, Bill of Rights, 139.
13
Kens, Lochner; Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century, see, in particular, chapter 6;
Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); see in
particular the discussion of the infamous Carolene Products footnote by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
signaling the shift away from applying heightened judicial scrutiny in cases involving economic regulation
and toward applying heightened scrutiny in cases involving individual rights, democratic processes, and
discrimination, 76 – 80.
14
Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court, 5.

14

the Fourteenth Amendment. As Morton J. Horwitz notes, the concept and scope of
incorporation was hotly debated during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s at the same time that
the Court incrementally increased the number of protections that were applied to the
states. According to Justice Brennan, it was during “the years from 1962 to 1969 that the
face of the law changed. Those years witnessed the extension to the states of nine of the
specifics of the Bill of Rights; decisions which have had a profound impact on American
life, requiring the deep involvement of state courts in the application of federal law.” This
new focus on individual liberties and a more expansive federal government led to the
strong federal constitutional jurisprudence regarding individual rights and liberties that
Justice Brennan argued state courts were applying to their own constitutions.15
The shift of the Supreme Court from its pre-Gitlow approach to its Warren Court
era tendency to rule in favor of individual rights and liberties and against state and federal
government actions restricting those liberties, resulted in expanded protections for
individuals in the areas of criminal justice, freedom of speech, and establishment of
religion. The increasing tendency of the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the provisions of
the Bill of Rights to the states required state legislatures to make massive changes in their
laws and procedures to ensure that state employees were applying federal protections.
New York, for example, attempted to revise its constitution in 1966 – 1967, in part to
align its bill of rights with the federal protections. According to political scientists G.
Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Porter, incorporation led “state judges to focus their

15

The freedoms of speech and press, free exercise of religion, and the right to peaceable assembly
were applied to the states in the 1930s. Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court, 67; Horwitz, The
Warren Court, 91 – 98; Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights,” Harvard Law Review 90, no. 3 (1977): 489 – 504, quote p. 493.

15

attention on the latest pronouncements from Washington, D.C.” The tendency to use the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights in state courts was so
widespread that it led Hans Linde, a former Oregon State Supreme Court Justice who was
among the first state judges to embrace state constitutionalism, to chastise his fellow state
judges for their wholesale application of federal protections.16
Scholars have not disputed the trend Judge Linde noticed: by the 1950s, during
the Warren Court’s increasing acceptance of incorporation and its generally expansive
interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts began interpreting their own bills
of rights in the same way as the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted corresponding
clauses in the federal Bill of Rights. As Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb have
noted, it is also clear that many states began to retreat from this approach in the 1970s
and adopted interpretations of their state bills of rights that differed from the federal
interpretations, usually by protecting individual rights at a higher level. The question is:
Why did this shift occur at the state level? Scholars generally attribute this movement to
the actions of libertarian-minded state courts and state judges, often highlighting the
16
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encouragement of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan. These scholars usually point to
the end of the Warren Court and the beginning of the Burger Court in 1969 and
corresponding fears that an ostensibly more conservative Court was likely to roll back
protections for individual rights.17
Tarr, a political scientist and prolific author on the topic of state constitutions,
argues that perceptions about the Burger Court’s intentions regarding civil liberties and
the early indications that those fears would be realized, led civil libertarians to seek other
avenues for expanding protections. There is some debate as to whether the Burger Court
actually represented a significant shift in the type and scope of Supreme Court decisions.
Legal scholars Larry M. Elison and Dennis NettikSimmons have presented an in-depth
analysis of the myriad ways the Burger Court scaled back Warren Court precedents, as
well as discussing the ways in which the Court attempted to limit the use of state
constitutionalism to expand rights protections. Regardless of the extent of the Burger
Court’s efforts, legal scholar Michael Colantuono directly attributes the rise of state
constitutionalism to state courts seeking to maintain the protections that existed under the
Warren Court in the face of declining federal protections under the Burger Court. These
scholars point to these actions as central to the growing interest in state constitutionalism
17
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during the 1970s and 1980s. Political scientists Robert M. Howard, Scott E. Graves, and
Julianne Flowers attribute the origins of state constitutionalism in the U.S. to “an
increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court” and the actions of Justice Brennan and
leading state judges. In addition to attributing the birth of this movement to Justice
Brennan, some of these scholars also recognize state judges, particularly Oregon
Supreme Court Justice Linde, as playing a significant role in the articulation and
advocacy of the state constitutionalism movement.18
Contemporary literature does attribute some of the support for state
constitutionalism to the fears raised by the changing leadership on the U.S. Supreme
Court. However, it also appears that many scholars, and some members of the public,
saw some Warren Court decisions as transient long before the ascendance of Chief
Justice Warren Burger. It is worth noting that a period of significant state constitutional
revision paralleled the Warren Court expansion of civil liberties. At the same time the
U.S. Supreme Court was applying the federal Bill of Rights to states, citizens in those
states were discussing the purpose and scope of state constitutions; and many states were
adopting bills of rights that went beyond the federal protections. Unfortunately, the very
few scholars who have examined both state constitutionalism and state constitutional
revision have rarely explored the relationship between the two movements. Political
scientist Janice May does briefly acknowledge the role that voter-approved constitutional
18
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amendments played in states adopting state constitutionalism and Colantuono focuses on
citizen-led backlash to particular rulings based on state constitutionalism. Montana’s
example suggests that it was a combination of state constitutional revision, the changing
U.S. Supreme Court, and a desire for a more balanced federal system that led to the
embrace of state constitutionalism.19
There is a woeful lack of historical research on state constitutions in the United
States, in general. As Finkelman and Gottlieb have noted, “most scholars have focused
their attentions on the history of the federal Constitution,” a lament which has been
echoed by the few historians, such as Christian Fritz, who have dedicated their research
to the history of state constitutions. Whereas significant historical questions about state
constitutions have not been researched (such as state-by-state histories of civil liberties
and state constitutional law), one area regarding state constitutions that has been explored
in some detail is the rich and varied history of state constitution-making in the United
States. Fritz argues that incorporating the history of state constitution-making into our
conception of American constitutionalism will result in a more complex and accurate
understanding of American history and the role of constitutionalism in that history.20
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Scholars have identified five major eras during which most state constitutionalrevision activity took place: the late eighteenth century when the first state constitutions
were drafted; the Jacksonian era when state constitutional-revision activity reflected a
growing democratic sentiment; the Civil War and Reconstruction era, when states drafted
constitutions to adapt to Civil War and Reconstruction politics and several new western
states drafted their initial constitutions; the Progressive era of the twentieth century (1900
– 1920s), when numerous states first adopted processes for popular votes on
constitutional amendments and initiatives; and finally the mid-1950s through early 1970s,
when numerous states revised their nineteenth-century constitutions. Montana’s 1972
Constitutional Convention falls squarely into this most recent era of state constitutionalrevision and reflects a number of the trends and tendencies of this period. Other states
which held constitutional conventions during this era included Alaska, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia. States which engaged in substantial attempts at constitutional
revision through other forms, such as legislative committees or constitutional
amendments, included Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, and Florida.21
Christian Fritz and other historians such as Marsha L. Baum, Suzanna Sherry,
Gordon M. Bakken, and David A. Johnson have explored the creation and interpretation
21
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of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century state constitutions. Some of this scholarship is
designed to counter critiques by twentieth-century legal scholars who have denigrated the
form and content of nineteenth century state constitutions, or historians such as Gordon
Wood, who have suggested that state constitution-makers unthinkingly borrowed
provisions from other state constitutions. While attempting to counter these narratives,
historians of state constitutions have focused on explaining why and how particular styles
and provisions were adopted during the different eras of state constitution-making or in
particular geographic regions. Few, if any, historians have studied the constitutional
revision that took place during the mid-twentieth century. The literature on mid-twentieth
century state constitutional revision is primarily scholarship by political scientists and
legal scholars on the general trends of state constitutional revisions or state-specific
reviews of mid-century constitutions. Exploring the history of the Montana Constitutional
Convention shows that the constitutional revision that took place in the mid-twentieth
century laid the groundwork for state constitutionalism and the move to provide more
protection for individual rights at the state level than that afforded by the federal Bill of
Rights.22
According to the political scientist Albert L. Sturm, pressure to reform state
constitutions began to mount in the mid-1950s, as both national and state commissions
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assessed the ability of state governments to handle pressing issues of civil rights and a
growing demand for state services. 23 In 1955 the Presidential Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, commonly referred to as the Kestnbaum Commission,
released a report critiquing state constitutions for their many limitations on government
activities. Increasingly during the 1960s, individuals and civic organizations criticized the
length and detailed nature of state constitutions, characteristics of nineteenth-century
constitutions, which Christian Fritz noted arose from a distrust of legislative power and
the prevailing constitutional theory that legislatures held unlimited power unless
limitations were explicitly placed on them. Those engaged in civic organizations began
calling for “modern” constitutions to remedy these flaws. As Sturm characterized it in
1969, such a modern constitution would “eschew traditional limitations” and move “away
from detail and toward simplification and flexibility, yet maintaining responsibility along
with responsiveness.”24
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Advocates for constitutional revision and legal scholars critical of existing state
constitutions echoed Sturm’s comments, many focusing on the concept of
“modernization” of state constitutions. This call for modernization reflected a number of
concerns regarding changes in society and states’ ability to keep up with these changes.
Some of these concerns were purely functional. Numerous authors called for expanding
taxing authority and the power of local governments or increasing states’ responses to
technological changes. A common thread running throughout the literature was a concern
about the changing nature of the federal government and its impact on the balance of
power between the federal and state governments. While calling for state constitutions
that would allow stronger and more responsive state governments, Robert B. Dishman
criticized “needlessly detailed” state constitutions:
To the extent that a government is kept from doing harm by detailed restrictions
on the exercise of its power, it is also kept from doing good. . . . If for this reason,
the legislature is unable to cope effectively with the pressing problems of the day,
the state has no one to blame but itself. Nor can it complain too loudly when the
federal government takes over responsibilities which the state and local
governments have not been allowed to meet effectively.25
The rhetoric surrounding calls for a new constitution in Montana closely tracked
the national debates and trends regarding “modernizing” state constitutions. The existing
1889 constitution was in many ways a typical nineteenth-century Western constitution. It
was the product of a six-week constitutional convention, the third in Montana’s short
history. Previous conventions had been held in 1866, just two years after Congress
25
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established Montana Territory in the 1864 Organic Act; and in 1884, which was inspired
by the recent completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad and the desire to levy taxes on
the newest addition to Montana’s transportation network. The 1866 convention was
mired in Civil War politics, failed to keep any records, and resulted in a constitution that
“was promptly lost.” The 1884 convention produced a document that, according to one
historian, “drew heavily from precedents found in existing state constitutions.” The
document drew widespread support among voters, likely due to the fact that voter
passage and congressional acceptance of a constitution were prerequisites for achieving
statehood. Despite support for the document and an intense desire for statehood among
Montanans, Congress did not approve the 1884 constitution. The politics of western
statehood were closely tied to the prevailing local political affiliations and political
tensions in Congress. Montana was narrowly Democratic at this time and the Republicancontrolled Senate was wary of admitting a state into the Union that could shift the
balance of power in Congress. The 1889 constitution was written, approved by voters,
and ultimately accepted by Congress due to an increase in Republican power in Congress
that alleviated fears of admitting a nominally Democratic state into the Union. 26
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The partisan convention delegates, thirty-nine Democrats and thirty-six
Republicans, produced a document in which “ninety percent of the wording of the earlier
constitution [the unsuccessful 1884 constitution] was readopted.” This document closely
reflected the interests of the delegates. Mining interests received favorable taxation
provisions, limiting the revenue-raising potential of the nascent state; and rural counties
succeeded in winning a “little federal system” apportionment scheme, ensuring “overrepresentation of rural counties” in the state legislature. Controversial issues, such as
suffrage for women, were rejected, purportedly because they could jeopardize the
primary goal of statehood. Reflecting the attitude of scholars and reformers during the
1950s through 1970s, the 1889 Constitution was critiqued by Montana historian and
constitutional revision advocate Margery Brown as very much a “product of its era—a
prescriptive code of laws for the problems of the day.”27
Almost immediately following its adoption, Montanans began to attempt to
amend the 1889 constitution. According to Alexander Blewett, chairman of the Montana
Constitutional Convention Commission, which was charged with compiling information
for and providing assistance to the 1972 delegates, the frequency of and increase in
amendments “led directly to the legislature's decision to place the question of calling a
convention before the people.” Between 1889 and 1969 over 500 amendments were
proposed in the legislature, sixty-one placed in front of the voters, and thirty-seven
successfully adopted. During the 1960s, there was a significant increase each legislative
session in the number of proposed constitutional amendments. Encompassing roughly
27
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28,000 words, the 1889 Montana constitution was about four times longer than the U.S.
Constitution. Critics in the 1950s and 1960s seized on this fact and, echoing the charges
of legal scholars and reformers across the country, criticized the document as too long
and too detailed and thus requiring frequent amendment. By 1967 there was a growing
consensus that “major areas of the Montana Constitution need[ed] examination and
modernization.” Under the existing system this could only occur in a “piecemeal”
manner. 28
Despite growing concerns about the efficacy of state constitutions during the
1960s, state legislatures often stood in the way of reform due to investment in the existing
power structures and representation schemes. Scholars universally point to the pivotal
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr (1962) as pushing open the gate to state
constitutional revision in the 1960s and 1970s. Historically, elections and the drawing of
legislative and other local election districts had been the responsibility of the states. Many
states, particularly in the South, apportioned districts in ways that discriminated against,
or even disenfranchised, ethnic or political groups. However, in the mid-twentieth
century the U.S. Supreme Court began to face the question of whether the Constitution
28
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required proportional representation in state and federal offices. The Court was first
asked whether Congressional districts had to include a roughly equal number of people in
Colegrove v. Green (1946). The Court rejected the argument that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required congressional districts to include
approximately the same number of people. They ruled that issues of congressional
apportionment were political in nature, best left to the legislatures and therefore outside
of the realm of judicial oversight.29
In the early 1960s, however, the Court revisited this decision and issued a number
of opinions on legislative apportionment. In Baker v. Carr (1962), the Court abandoned
its opinion that reapportionment was a political question beyond the reach of the judicial
branch. Once the Court had determined that apportionment was a judicially appropriate
topic, a number of cases regarding apportionment came before the Court. Throughout
these cases the Court articulated the concept of equal political power, or “one person, one
vote.” In Reynolds v. Sims (1964) the concept was clearly declared a constitutional
principle; the Court ruled that an apportionment scheme that awarded one state senator
per county—instead of apportioning representation in both chambers of the state
legislature based on population—was a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said that it violated the concepts of fairness required
in a representative system to dilute the political power of individuals based on where they
live. “Little federal” and county unit systems across the country faced extinction based on
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the “one person, one vote” concept. As political scientist John Dinan has noted, “once the
Court made it clear that malapportionment would no longer be tolerated, rural legislators
were no longer able to prevent the calling of conventions.” Reapportionment sparked
significant political change in numerous state legislatures and broke down barriers to
constitutional revision.30
As with many states, reapportionment was central to the steps leading up to
Montana’s constitutional convention. The 1889 constitution included an apportionment
scheme very similar to the one the Court had struck down in Reynolds v. Sims. This
scheme gave a drastically disproportionate amount of power to the rural counties; in fact,
according to historian Harry Fritz, “senators representing just 16 percent of the people
constituted a legislative majority.” Even after the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
regarding reapportionment, the powerful and entrenched set of rural legislators “refused
to apportion themselves out of their jobs.” As a result, a federal court took over
reapportionment and created new districts for the 1966 legislative elections. 31
The new districts resulted in a shift in legislative “representation from rural to
urban counties” across Montana. According to Fritz, there was a “political revolution” in
Montana that “began with federally-mandated legislative reapportionment.” New,
younger, more professional and more middle-class individuals were elected to the
legislature. These legislators brought with them a focus on modernization, and in
30
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journalist Charles Johnson’s view, they were “reluctant to stay shackled to the old
constitution.” 32
Reapportionment converged with several other events in Montana that brought
about a particular and new political culture. The Anaconda Company (often referred to as
simply, “The Company”), a massive mining venture that was the largest corporation in
Montana, had wielded vast political and economic power throughout the first half of the
twentieth century. The Company was so synonymous with power that a common
narrative developed in Montana of the “little guy” versus the Company. Many politicians
and reformers set themselves up in this manner to gain the trust and support of the voters.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Company began to loosen its grip on Montana politics;
instead of legislators turning to Company staff for advice, the legislature formed the
Legislative Council and hired its first staff in 1957. The long-standing interest in
reforming government and removing the Company’s influence ushered in a focus on
updating, reforming, and professionalizing the legislature and government in Montana.33
Moreover, the Company’s economic influence began to dwindle just as its role in
politics had begun to wane. In the late 1950s, the long-serving head of the Company
32
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retired and the organization moved towards a more modern structure. The business began
to shift its focus from Montana copper to Chilean copper. Around the same time, the
Company sold its chain of newspapers. The firm had controlled the papers in all major
cities except Great Falls. The Lee Newspaper chain out of the Midwest bought all of the
Company’s papers and, at least to some extent, the editorial focus shifted; and the papers
hired young professional journalists with an interest in investigative and national
journalism. In some areas, especially Missoula, these new journalists zeroed in on the
burgeoning environmental movement, which was building strong grass roots presence
and organizing to pass environmental legislation in 1967 in Montana. 34
The end of the 1960s and the dawn of the 1970s saw a further reduction in the
Company’s economic and political investment in Montana. During 1969 and 1971, “the
Marxist Allende government of Chile nationalized the great Anaconda mines there and
drove that old, established corporation to the brink of bankruptcy.” This sapped the
Company’s resources and drove its focus away from Montana, just as the state was
preparing to craft a new constitution. At the same time, there was an active student
movement protesting the Vietnam War, which succeeded in shutting down the dorms at
Montana State University and hosting a well-attended student strike at the University of
Montana in 1970. All of these forces—reapportionment, the declining power of the
Company, a new focus on professionalism and modern government, a fresh and active
34
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news media, and an active liberal grassroots community—converged and created a sense
of optimism, possibility, and dedication to reform and the future. It also resulted in a
transition in political power away from older, rural, corporate-focused leaders and toward
younger, more middle-class, reform-focused individuals.35
This shift in political power was a necessary step for the legislature to take action
toward a constitutional convention. They did so by passing House Resolution No. 17 and
Senate Resolution No. 22, identical documents, during the 1967 legislative session,
which directed the Legislative Council to study and “determine whether or not the
present constitution of Montana is adequately serving the needs of the people of the
state.” The Legislative Council study compared the Montana constitution, section by
section, with similar sections in the constitutions recently enacted by Alaska, Hawaii,
Michigan, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and in the Model State Constitution of the National
Municipal League. According to legal scholars Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder, these
particular documents were chosen for comparison “because of either their recent adoption
or their evaluation as excellent state constitutions.” The result was an unfavorable report
on the adequacy of the constitution. In stark words, the Legislative Council reported:
This study has led to the general conclusion that there is
need for substantial revision and improvement in the Montana
constitution. Provisions which invite subterfuge, provisions
which are archaic, provisions which are ambiguous, provisions
which are statutory, and provisions which place serious limitations
on effective state government were found throughout the
35
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Montana constitution. The changes needed in the Montana
constitution cannot be accomplished adequately through the
present amendment process. 36
In particular, the Legislative Council urged a restructuring of “state government to meet
modern needs.” The Legislative Council asserted that Montana needed a constitution with
a focus on basic guiding principles instead of topics that were better addressed in
statutory law. In response to this report the 1969 legislature placed referendum 67 before
the voters in 1970 and established the Montana Constitution Revision Commission.
Referendum 67 asked the voters whether a constitutional convention should be called.
Voters answered with a resounding yes; 133,482 voiced their support and only 71,643
objected. 37
The resulting constitution, including its far-reaching Declaration of Rights, laid
the groundwork for the later embrace of state constitutionalism by the Montana Supreme
Court. This followed a regional trend: scholars agree that both attorneys and courts in
western states have been more likely to embrace the concept of state constitutionalism.
As Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie, and John Kincaid reported from their survey and
analysis of state constitutional-grounds decisions in the first half of the 1980s, unlike
other regions, in cases before state courts in the West “state constitutional issues are
raised with greater frequency than, or the same frequency as, federal constitutional issues
36
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in individual rights cases.”38 Montana, in particular, is recognized as one of the most
active states in using independent state constitutional grounds. The Collins, Galie, and
Kincaid survey found that the Montana Supreme Court was among the 9% of U.S. state
courts where “state claims are raised more frequently than federal claims.” Jeffrey S.
Walz and Staci L. Beavers found in 1998 that during the 1970s and 1980s Montana was
among the top four states where state supreme court decisions on criminal procedure
issues had been based on state rather than federal constitutional grounds 39
The active use of state constitutionalism in Montana is directly attributable to the
unique provisions of the 1972 Constitution. As former Montana Supreme Court Justice,
Frank B. Morrison, commented in the 1980s in the Collins, Galie, and Kincaid survey:
During the years I have been a Montana Supreme Court Justice, I have become
more interested in developing the area of law known as "independent state
grounds." The new Montana Constitution adopted in 1972 is a rather unique
document and provides a basis for considerable departure from federal precedent.
This has been particularly true in the civil area where we have developed a new
38
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equal protection law relying upon the implication of fundamental rights declared
in our State Constitution and requiring a showing of a compelling state interest to
justify legislative discrimination.40
This modern, influential constitution was not produced by legal scholars or
judges; it was written by citizen-delegates with public input. The delegates to the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention represented a cross-section of the population. It was
indeed a grassroots convention; this was in large part due to the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court in The Forty-Second Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana v.
Joseph L. Lennon (1971), which held that all state and local elected officials were
ineligible to serve as delegates to the upcoming state constitutional convention. The
court based its decision on a somewhat obscure provision in the 1889 constitution that
prohibited public officials from holding more than one office. As a result of this decision
the races for convention delegates were heavily contested: 532 people ran for the 100
delegate positions. Individuals who had never served in office, who had lost previous
campaigns for the legislature, or who had little political experience won election as
constitutional convention delegates.
Delegates were elected in November 1971 at the same election at which they were
faced with a Republican-led referendum to institute a sales tax. Voters soundly rejected
the sales tax proposal, two to one. It is highly likely that the Republican party advocacy
for the sales tax referendum affected the outcome of the delegate elections, with antisales tax voters declining to vote for candidates who supported the sales tax proposal.

40 Collins, Galie, and Kincaid, “State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights
Litigation since 1980,” 145.
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According to Charles Johnson, many of those elected were such political neophytes that
they had never before been inside the capitol building where the convention was held. He
argued that “people who could never have been elected to the legislature were elected to
the constitutional convention.” Among those who were unlikely to be elected to the
legislature but were chosen for the convention were women. The 1971 legislature, for
instance, included only one female member—Representative Dorothy Bradley of
Bozeman—while nineteen women were elected to the convention. Many of these women
were members of the League of Women Voters. As Bob Campbell, delegate from
Missoula, noted, “The League of Women Voters found that they were not only well
versed on why a new constitution was needed, but their role went from lobbyists to
candidates.” The presence of so many women activists, he contended, had a strong
impact on the content of the constitution.41
Once convened, the unlikely delegates spent less than three months crafting a new
constitution. According to Elison and Snyder, the record shows that despite their lack of
knowledge and political experience, the delegates were driven, confident, and “relied on
their own experience coupled with 2,300 pages of carefully researched reports prepared
by a group of dedicated researchers.” The delegates attacked the work of the convention
by dividing into ten committees, each with the responsibility for crafting a section of the
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constitution. Four other committees monitored the procedural, stylistic, and
administrative concerns of the convention.42
While the delegates were elected on a partisan basis there was, and is,
overwhelming consensus that the delegates generally engaged with each other in a
nonpartisan manner. As Elison and Snyder noted, “Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents lined up against other Democrats, Republicans, and Independents on many
issues.” The convention broke with the legislature’s tradition of seating arranged by
party; instead, they were seated alphabetically. Betty Babcock, delegate and wife of the
former Governor Tim Babcock, proudly claimed that the delegates “came together for
good government” regardless of party. Leo Graybill, who was elected chair of the
convention, told the Associated Press that he saw “no evidence of partisan politics.”
Instead, Graybill commented, the convention seemed to divide along liberal, moderate,
and conservative ideological lines. The Billings Gazette attributed the phenomenon to “a
truly bipartisan slate of leaders and committee chairmen, and most important,
fundamental issues on which neither party has a traditional position.” The ideological
divide that Graybill witnessed was often categorized by the press more simplistically:
sometimes it described the differences as a liberal-conservative split and sometimes as an
ideological split. It never however, defined differences as a partisan divide. According to
the Gazette, the ideological division in the convention could be best illustrated by the two
sides, each of which contained members of all parties, of a debate between those who
wanted “broad sweeping changes in the constitution versus those who would like it
changed only slightly.” These ideological divisions often reflected rural-urban and
42
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eastern Montana-western Montana divisions as well, with the urban and western
delegates generally more in favor of broad change.43
This analysis comports with Montana’s political history. Partisan loyalty had
never been a powerful factor in Montana politics. The Company had long had caucuses
within each major party. Effective coalitions, such as the Progressive reformers of the
early twentieth century, often organized across party lines with an emphasis on particular
issues. In addition, it was common for politicians to enter politics easily and view
themselves as reformers fighting centralized power, in the form of corporations or the
government, on behalf of the people. The non-partisan emphasis of the convention on
individual rights and issues such as open government is perfectly tied into the traditional
narrative of politicians in Montana.44
These reform minded delegates consciously, and with the input of the public,
drafted a constitution that was intended to provide strong protections for individual
rights. As the following chapter will show, state constitutionalism was integral to the
efforts and arguments of constitutional revision advocates from the 1950s to the 1970s
and the Montana delegates were well-informed about and connected to the constitutional
revision activity that was occurring across the country. In addition, the public was
43
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familiar with the concept of state constitutionalism and encouraged the delegates to
establish state protections for individual rights that were independent of those guaranteed
by the federal Constitution.
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Chapter 3: State Constitutional Revision and State Constitutionalism

While many scholars point to the genesis of the concept of state constitutionalism
in judicial decisions or law review articles in the mid-1970s, the idea was actually an
integral aspect of mid-century constitutional revision and was part of the many
discussions regarding the scope and purpose of state constitutions that took place in the
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.1 During this era, legal scholars, political scientists,
legislators, and other political players crafted numerous documents on constitutional
revision and the purpose and ideal components of state constitutions. This literature
addressed concerns about the state of federalism and the changing balance of power
between the state and federal governments. Additionally, it discussed ways for states to
boost their power in relation to the federal government. Expanding constitutional
protections for individual rights beyond the federal protections is one way scholars
argued that states could limit federal involvement in areas traditionally under state
authority.
People representing three groups produced the mid-century material on
constitutional revision: civic organizations, state constitutional revision commissions, and
scholars based in universities or law schools. These organizations and scholars identified
a number of problems with existing state constitutions: the foundational documents
limited the effectiveness of state and local governments and their ability to address issues
related to changing technology, population growth, and societal changes; they contained
outdated and irrelevant provisions; and they were lengthy and too detailed. The vast
1

See Chapter One, note 8.
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majority of those who asserted that state constitutions were inadequate and needed to be
revised had a core concern: weak and inefficient state governments and constitutions had
contributed to the shift in the balance of power from the states to the federal government.
Those who held this view believed that the federal system was endangered because the
states had become too weak in relation to the federal government. As an analysis of the
literature on this topic will show, this viewpoint was not limited to conservatives or
states’ rights advocates, but shared by those in moderate and left-leaning organizations.2
The Council of State Governments (CSG) and the National Municipal League
(NML) were two of the leading civic organizations that were particularly active during
this era. 3 They produced extensive contemporary documentation on state constitutional
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revision trends. CSG, for instance, regularly published biennial reports on state
constitutional revision activities. Some of these reports asserted that societal changes,
such as the civil rights movement or advances in technology, and Warren court decisions
presented states with new challenges and expectations that could not be met under
existing state constitutions. CSG argued that it was necessary to revise state constitutions
in order for states to have the legal authority to address these challenges because the
existing constitutions sharply limited state government in various ways such as making it
difficult to levy taxes, sharply limiting the length and scope of legislative sessions, or
limiting the strength of executive officers. The organization expressed significant concern
about the expansive decisions of the Warren Court and the growing tendency of the
federal government to intervene in areas historically under state authority, such as
apportionment of legislative districts. The Council of State Governments advocated for
modernizing and enhancing state constitutions in order to prevent the U.S. Supreme
Court from ruling that state laws or systems fell short of the protections required by the
U.S. Constitution. Doing so, they argued, would allow states to “remain viable partners in
the federal system.”4
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In the middle of the twentieth century the National Municipal League (NML)
engaged numerous scholars to examine the efficacy of existing state constitutions and
make suggestions for reform. The NML had significant influence on discussions
regarding constitutional revision and the content of revised state constitutions.5 On behalf
of the NML, Albert Sturm pointed to the Supreme Court’s reapportionment decisions,
population growth and urbanization, and the civil rights movement as emerging
challenges to state authority which states were unable to adequately address because of
the nature of their constitutions. State constitutions impaired states’ ability to respond to
these challenges, according to Sturm, because they were too detailed, limited the powers
of the legislature and executive branches too severely, and simply lacked provisions
regarding modern concerns such as technological advances. In another NML document,
Robert Dishman directly linked the states’ inability to address modern challenges with
restrictive existing constitutions. As a result, he asserted, the federal government had to
insert itself into problems that should be handled on a state level. This assertion was
backed up by the Kestnbaum Commission’s 1955 report, which partially blamed weak
state governments and their inadequate constitutions for expanded federal authority.6
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To address these challenges, the NML produced a Model State Constitution,
which encouraged brevity and increased state legislative powers. The model constitution
also included protections for individual rights that went beyond those found in the federal
constitution. John P. Wheeler of the NML clarified that advocates of NML-style
constitutional revision did not embrace stronger state constitutions and state governments
to further a “states’ rights” agenda. Instead, Wheeler asserted, strong and relevant state
governments made for a stronger federal system, which would allow for greater citizen
participation, offer the opportunity for more relevant and tailored government programs,
and make it less likely that the centralized federal government would over-reach its
sphere of authority.7
Scholars writing for government advisory commissions concurred with the
assertions of the NML and the CSG. On behalf of the federal Public Administration
Service, political scientist David Fellman pointed out that federal Supreme Court
decisions or recent federal statutes had invalidated numerous state constitutional
provisions or made them anachronistic. For example, the Kentucky constitution limited
suffrage to male citizens, a provision that had been invalidated by the Nineteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920. In his report to the Michigan constitutional
7
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convention, law professor Paul G. Kauper lamented the increasing powers of the federal
government, such as greater federal regulation of the economy as a result of the U. S.
Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and the consequent increased federal intervention into state affairs. In
particular, he pointed to the ways that the application of the Bill of Rights to the states,
otherwise known as incorporation, had limited state authority. For example, decisions
prohibiting school segregation had led to federal oversight of local school districts. He
attributed much of this increased intervention and the judicial review of state practices
and laws to the failure of states to function effectively or adequately protect the civil
rights of their citizens.8
In his independent scholarship, legal scholar Roger H. Thompson asserted that
since the late 1940s the federal government had exerted growing power over the states,
particularly in economic affairs and with the rise of federal aid to the states—which came
with specific guidelines and oversight—for housing, healthcare, and education programs.
Indeed, he argued now “there is almost no area of traditional state activity from which
Congress is excluded.” He forcefully advocated for preserving the federal system,
while—much like Wheeler of the NML—dismissing the calls of states’ rights advocates
to allow states to reject federal laws.9
Across the board, these scholars and advocates of constitutional revision argued
that adopting new state constitutions or reforming old ones would give states the ability
to maintain their relevance and preserve the federal system. For example, the New York
8
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Committee for Economic Development pointed to the need to revitalize the federal
system as a key reason for New York to revise its constitution. Because much of the
federal government’s intervention in areas of state authority was a result of states’ failure
to protect individual rights, advocates argued that strengthening states’ bills of rights was
one way to boost state authority and limit federal intervention.10
Groups and individuals writing about constitutional revision universally identified
the bill of rights as one of the fundamental components of a state constitution. As early as
1955, the Alaska Statehood Committee addressed the importance of states’ bills of rights
and the possibility of including rights that were not protected at the federal level. The
suggestion that states update their bills of rights and include new “modern” rights ran
throughout the mid-century literature on constitutional revision. 11
Writing in 1960, Fellman encouraged states to revise their bills of rights to reflect
modern society and new understandings of fundamental rights, such as protection against
discrimination, rights of women, due process rights in administrative proceedings, and
prohibition against electronic monitoring. In 1961, Kauper strongly advocated for states
to maintain or adopt stronger protections in their bills of rights than those that existed at
the federal level, especially in the areas of equal protection and anti-discrimination.
Doing so, he asserted, not only allowed for states to identify and protect newly accepted
or identified rights, but would also result in “maximum state responsibility and autonomy
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in this area and a corresponding minimum of federal intervention.” As Thompson noted
in 1966, states had the legal authority to go beyond the protections contained in the
federal Bill of Rights. Indeed, he suggested, it would make sense to do so because not all
the federal protections had been applied to the states, because states could develop novel
approaches to protecting individuals from new challenges to their rights, and because it
would strengthen the relationship between individuals and their state government. In
1967, the New York Committee for Economic Development identified “private and civil
rights” beyond those protected at the federal level as “crucial elements” to be examined
and included in a new state constitution. Even at the end of the Warren Court era in
1968, Albert Sturm considered the federal protections to be “minimal” and “insufficient”
and urged states to revise their constitutions to include rights that had recently been
identified, such as broad anti-discrimination clauses. 12
Because these discussions took place from the mid-1950s through the late 1960s,
it is clear that they were not a result of anticipation that the Burger Court would be more
conservative than the Warren Court. Instead, they explicitly linked the idea of providing
stronger state protections for individual rights to strengthening the federal system. This
interest in increasing state authority and diminishing the potential for federal intervention
in the states comports with the discussions and political culture in Montana in 1972, and
is apparent in the constitution adopted by the state that same year.
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The delegates to Montana’s constitutional convention were fully aware of the
various positions and materials on constitutional revision produced by scholars and civic
organizations. The Montana Constitutional Convention Commission ordered a series of
research reports for the delegates. These reports included historical background on the
Montana and U.S. Constitutions, documents analyzing recent constitutional revision
activities in other states, comparisons of new or highly regarded state constitutions; topicand section-specific analysis and suggestions; and the scholarship of attorneys,
professors, researchers, civic organizations and governmental commissions on the role
and content of state constitutions. Given their lack of political, and in most cases, legal
experience, the delegates relied heavily on these reports and the research and assistance
of the convention staff.13 The delegates also received input from convention staff, the
media, and the Montana public, which encouraged them to craft a constitution that
protected individual rights at a uniquely high level.
All convention delegates received, and the members of the Bill of Rights
Committee read and discussed, a 425-page report on the Bill of Rights, authored by Rick
Applegate, the committee’s research analyst. This document included histories of
particular rights and their application at the federal and state levels and contemporary
debates and discussions about emerging rights. Throughout the document, Applegate
forcefully advocated for the committee to view the federal protections as minimums and
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Montana Constitutional Convention Studies, Reports No. 1 – 16 and Memorandums No. 1 – 10,
prepared by the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission for the delegates to the Montana
Constitutional Convention, (Helena, Montana, 1971). All of the documents analyzed earlier in this chapter
were included in Report No. 4 and Memorandum No. 3.; Elison and Snyder, The Montana State
Constitution, 10 – 11.
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to draft a constitution that would result in “the vigorous enforcement and extension of
safeguards of civil liberty.”14
Applegate discussed the state of federalism in the United States and the reasons
for a stronger state bill of rights, and he advanced suggestions for new rights that the
convention could include in Montana’s 1972 constitution. Like many scholars, Applegate
attributed the federal government’s ascendency in the role of civil liberties to the failure
of states to rigorously protect individual rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’s acceptance
of the incorporation doctrine. He strenuously advocated for strong state bills of rights for
three primary reasons. First, he argued, the federal protections were the bare minimum. If
states went beyond those protections, they would be returning to their traditional role as
the primary protector of civil liberties and would prevent further federal intervention into
state affairs. Second, not all the federal protections had been extended to the states and, in
a departure from the scholars of the 1960s and in language that anticipated Justice
Brennan’s analysis in his 1977 article, Applegate argued that the decisions of the Warren
Court faced significant opposition and could be rolled-back by a more conservative
Burger Court. Finally, he argued that modern society required more and different rights
protections than those adopted in the eighteenth century and that the states had the unique
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Rick Applegate, Bill of Rights, 4. At the time of the constitutional convention Rick Applegate
was a recent graduate of the University of Montana where he had been deeply involved in left-leaning
student activism, including protesting the Vietnam War and advocating for student rights. See, George
James, “Con-Con Comments By the Delegates From District 23,” Great Falls Tribune, February 5, 1972,
Brown Collection, 40; Frank Adams, “Or Maybe Its Not So Hot: Bill of Rights is Good, But it Could Have
Been Better,” The Montana Standard, March 13, 1972, Brown Collection, 173; James Grady, “Turn In
Draft Cards: Students, Teachers Pledge Passive Draft Resistance,” Montana Kaimin 71, no. 82, (April 23,
1969): 1, Record Group 22, Box 3, Folder 1, Constitutional Convention Collection, Montana Historical
Soceity Archives and Library, Helena, MT (hereafter cited as RG 22, MHSL).
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ability to be “little laboratories,” experimenting with protecting emerging rights and
setting the groundwork for protecting those rights at a national level.15
A large portion of Applegate’s Bill of Rights was dedicated to discussing ways
Montana’s new constitution could protect individual rights at a higher level than the
federal government in both emerging, yet accepted, realms as well as novel areas.
Chapter X of Applegate’s Bill of Rights was dedicated solely to new rights, such as equal
protection, non-discrimination, extending constitutional individual rights protections to
actions by private entities, and rights of minors. His final chapter, “Contemporary
Concerns and The Bill of Rights,” explored novel concepts such as preventing
discrimination based on income, incorporating a right to life’s basic necessities, and
balancing rights to privacy with zero-population goals. Throughout the other sections of
Bill of Rights, Applegate dedicated considerable space to more widely-accepted,
emerging rights that were the topic of debate at the federal level such as the right to
privacy, rights of prisoners, and environmental rights.16
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On Rick Applegate’s analysis of federalism and civil liberties issues, see Applegate, Bill of
Rights, 3, all of Chapter 3, “Are States’ Bills of Rights Necessary?,” 47 – 63, and 129 – 130. For
Applegate’s discussion of the Warren Court- Burger Court transition see, Applegate, Bill of Rights, 53 – 54,
and 55. This was a minor part of his argument but, since it differs from the scholars of the 1960s and
sounds like those of the mid-1970s, it does suggest that a transition was beginning to take place in the
arguments of those advocating for state constitutionalism. It also suggests that both an interest in federalism
and fears about a loss of protections at the federal level could have contributed to Montana’s acceptance of
state constitutionalism. For his discussion on states as “little laboratories,” see Applegate, Bill of Rights, 4,
11, 19, and 56. The term “little laboratories” was first used by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), and refers to the concept of states as independent sovereign
entities that could serve as laboratories for democratic reforms which could later be extended to the county
as a whole.
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Applegate, Bill of Rights, Chapter X “New Provisions,” 301 – 324, Chapter XI “Contemporary
Concerns and the Bill of Rights,” 325 – 356, Chapter VI “Procedural Rights and Issues,” 129 – 213,
Chapter VII “Privacy and Its Invasions,” 215 – 248, and Chapter VIII “Environmental Protection,” 249 –
285.
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Applegate’s Bill of Rights and the various writings on state constitutional revision
that the delegates received identified changes to the federal system, resulting in greater
federal intervention into areas traditionally under state control—particularly in the realm
of civil liberties—as a serious problem. They also identified constitutional revision and
the adoption of state bills of rights that went beyond the federal protections as the
solution to this problem. Delegates were not only provided the written materials, but
during the first week of the convention, study sessions were held during committee
meetings with staff presenting and discussing these documents. Because these were the
primary sources of scholarship and information on the topic for the delegates, it is clear
that the delegates were familiar with the general debates on state constitutional revision,
federalism, and the role of incorporation and states’ bills of rights. They also received
strong suggestions about why and how to go beyond federal protections in Montana’s
new bill of rights.17
The research and recommendations of convention staff and the work of scholars
and civic organizations across the country would have been influential on their own.
However, members of the public in Montana, both in the media and the voting public in
general, shared these concerns about the status of federalism and the effects of the
Supreme Court’s incorporation decisions. These Montanans also urged the delegates to
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Elison and Snyder, The Montana State Constitution, 10 – 11; Minutes of the First Meeting of
the Bill of Rights Committee, Montana Constitutional Convention, January 17, 1972, RG 22, Box 2, Folder
2-37, MHSL; Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Bill of Rights Committee, Montana Constitutional
Convention, January 20, 1972, Folder 2-37, Box 2, RG22, MHSL; Minutes of the Third Meeting of the
Bill of Rights Committee, Montana Constitutional Convention, January 21, 1972, RG22, Box 2, Folder 237, MHSL.
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draft a constitution that went beyond the individual rights protections contained in the
U.S. Constitution.
Media outlets in Montana that discussed the concept of state constitutionalism and
encouraged greater state protections fell into two categories: legal media and local and
statewide newspapers. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Montana Law Review
(MLR)—the legal journal of the University of Montana School of Law—produced
numerous articles that discussed the relationship between state and federal law and civil
rights and liberties, encouraged strong state protections for individual rights, and
presented analyses of how and why Montana should go beyond the protections contained
in the federal Bill of Rights. As a majority of the twenty-four convention delegates who
were attorneys had attended the University of Montana School of Law after WWII, it can
be assumed that they had considerable familiarity with the articles published in the
MLR.18
As early as 1950, Montana Law Review author David Williams had advocated for
Montana courts to interpret state constitutional provisions as protecting individual rights
at a higher level than federal interpretations of similar provisions. Williams presented an
analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions, Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) and American
Federation of Labor v. Swing (1940), which had found picketing to be protected speech
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Williams pointed out that Montana
18

This analysis on the content and tenor of the Montana Law Review is based on the author’s
review of all of its publications from 1945 to 2010. See also, Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings, 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention, 7 vols., prepared by the Montana Legislature in cooperation with the
Montana Legislative Council and the Constitutional Convention Editing and Publishing Committee
(Helena, Montana, 1979): vol. 1, “Delegate Biographies and Delegate Proposals,” available online at
http://courts.mt.gov/library/montana_laws.mcpx (Accessed on June 3, 2010) (hereafter cited as Verbatim
Transcript).
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had held picketing to be protected speech and subject to very strong protection under the
Montana Constitution since 1908, as a result of the Montana Supreme Court ruling in
Lindsay & Co., Ltd. v. Montana Federation of Labor (1908). He argued that, despite
recent federal rulings, Montana courts should continue to apply the more stringent state
protections because Montana’s free speech clause was intended to be stronger than the
federal clause. Also in 1950, David R. Mason, anticipating potential incorporation
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the Fourth Amendment, encouraged
Montana to provide more stringent requirements—either constitutionally or statutorily—
for arrest warrants in order to avoid federal challenges or oversight.19
During the 1960s the Montana Law Review regularly published articles or notes
discussing the concept of state constitutionalism. In 1964, in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), which held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide attorneys to indigent defendants,
Larry Elison analyzed Montana’s approach to assigning attorneys to indigent defendants.
He pointed to local desires to avoid federal oversight of the state criminal justice system
and the potential for the Court to extend the right to counsel to administrative hearings
and appeals as reasons why either Montanans or the Montana Supreme Court could, and

19

David Williams, “Peaceful Picketing as an Exercise of Free Speech,” Montana Law Review 11,
(1950): 68 – 81. This article presents an analysis of the long-standing absolute right to free speech in
Montana (first established in 1908) and provides a very strong counter to the argument of scholars who
assert that states did not have developed state-specific constitutional law on civil liberties prior to the
Warren Court era and the subsequent application of state constitutionalism in the 1970s. For an example of
this argument see, Alan G. Tarr, “The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism,” Publius 24, no. 2
(1994): 63 – 79. On the general historical inadequacy of state constitutions see, Kermit L. Hall, “Mostly
Anchor and Little Sail” in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, eds. Paul Finkelman
and Stephen E. Gottlieb (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). David R. Mason, “Arrests Without a
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should, establish a broader right to counsel at the state level than was required under the
federal constitution. 20
The right to privacy was a popular topic in the MLR and in a 1965 analysis of this
evolving right, Gary L. Davis commented on the inadequacy of existing federal
protections and, in particular, the absence of an explicit right to privacy in the federal
Constitution. He also assessed the status of Montana privacy protections and, in light of
the inadequate federal protections and his assertion that states were better positioned to
protect the right to privacy, encouraged Montana to more stringently protect privacy by
any means possible, including state supreme court interpretation, statute, common law,
and new legislation. In a 1968 MLR article Elison advocated for strengthening the right of
privacy. He suggested combining it with the right to free expression in order to provide
constitutional protection for obscenity. This privacy-enhanced freedom of expression
right did not need to be established at the federal level: Elison encouraged Montana and
other states to further cement the right to privacy and to strengthen the freedom of
expression independent of federal protections.21
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Larry M. Elison, “Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and The Practice,” Montana Law
Review 26, (1964 – 1965): 1 – 30. Larry Elison was a professor of law at the University of Montana School
of Law and taught a number of the attorneys who served as delegates to the convention as well as testified
before the convention committees. He served as a resource to Bob Campbell, a member of the Bill of
Rights Committee and the author of a number of proposals for new constitutional provisions guaranteeing
individual rights, many of which went beyond the federal Bill of Rights either in degree or because they
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the concept. Bob Campbell, excerpt from unpublished manuscript sent via email February 19, 2010, in
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Gary L. Davis, “Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Privacy,” Montana Law Review 27,
(1965 – 1966): 173 – 192. At the time this article was written, the U.S. Supreme Court had only hinted at a
federal right to privacy, which they found later that year in the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth,
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On the eve of its meeting in 1971, P. Bruce Harper encouraged the convention to
adopt new constitutional provisions that would go beyond federal protections in his
article on equal access to facilities and establishments, “vagrancy laws,” and loitering
statutes that denied services or access to homeless individuals and members of particular
counter-cultures. 22 These various MLR articles represented decades of discussion among
Montana’s legal community on topics of federalism and civil rights and liberties. They
and the legal culture they represent plausibly had an impact on, at a minimum, the
twenty-four attorneys who were delegates to the convention. At least one of the advocates
for this position in Montana, Professor Larry Elison, who authored several of these
articles, testified before committees and provided assistance and feedback on proposals to
the delegates, suggesting that even those delegates who were not members of the legal
community were exposed to his theories regarding state constitutionalism.
It was not just members of the legal community in Montana who were aware of
and advocated for state constitutionalism. Local newspapers ran editorials and articles
discussing the concept during the constitutional convention and encouraged delegates to
adopt a bill of rights that was strong, independent, and more protective of individuals
than the federal Bill of Rights. The press reported extensively on the Bill of Rights
Committee and consistently noted that the committee was considering or adopting
provisions that went beyond the protections in the existing state constitution and the
federal Constitution. For example, the Great Falls Tribune ran an article about the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Larry M.
Elison and Gary L. Graham, “Obscenity: A Compromise Proposal,” Montana Law Review 30, (1968 –
1969): 123 – 140.
22
P. Bruce Harper, “Locomotion, Liberty, and Legislation,” Montana Law Review 32, (1971): 279
– 293; Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Bill of Rights Committee; Campbell, Manuscript.
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committee’s proposal, which was eventually adopted, to extend the rights of adults to
minors that they entitled: “Montana Studies a National First: Basic Rights for Children,
Youth.”23
Additionally, the handful of editorials addressing the Bill of Rights encouraged
the convention delegates to go beyond federal protections. An editorial in the Billings
Gazette called for a “strong, broad bill of rights” that was “more strict and inclusive than
the federal one.” As part of a complex battle over a provision guaranteeing citizens open
access to public meetings and records, several newspapers called for a strong, absolute
“right to know” that was unlike anything at the federal level.24
While the legal media and local newspapers reported on and encouraged the
delegates to adopt state constitutionalism, the many members of the Montana public
strongly advocated for state protections that went beyond the federal Bill of Rights. 25 The
public’s familiarity with and strong advocacy for the concept is best documented in the
correspondence between the public and convention delegates and public testimony before
23

A review of the newspaper clippings from around the state about the constitutional convention
held in the Brown Collection at the University of Montana William J. Jameson Law Library shows at least
62 articles written about the Bill of Rights Committee and its proposals. The vast majority of these articles
point out that many of the proposals advanced new rights or rights that were not recognized at the federal
level. J.D. Holmes, “Montana Studies a National First: Basic Rights for Children, Youth,” Great Falls
Tribune, 11, February 1, 1972, Brown Collection, 25.
24
Editorial, “Let’s Have Bill of Rights,” Billings Gazette, February 10, 1972, Brown Collection,
57; For more on the debate surrounding the Right to Know provision, see Chapter Four; Editorial, “A
Freedom Abridged,” The Independent Record, Helena, 4, March, 9, 1972, Brown Collection, 155;
Editorial, “It’s the Public’s Right to Know,” Great Falls Tribune, 22, March 10, 1972, Brown Collection,
167.
25
The delegates did receive one letter from Frank Clift, a prolific letter-to-the-editor writer, who
argued that a state bill of rights was unnecessary because of the incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights.
He also, however, goes on to say that American citizens have more rights than are explicitly protected in
the federal Constitution as a result of the Ninth Amendment. He also comments on the unconstitutionality
of most federal legislation, especially education funding. Frank Clift to Lucile Speer, January 25, 1972,
Lucille Speers Papers, Collection Number MSS 585, Box 6, Folder 1, Maureen and Mike Mansfield
Library Archives and Special Collections, University of Montana—Missoula (hereafter cited as, “Speer
Papers, MSS 585, UMML”)
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convention committees. There were multiple examples of Montanans championing new
and unique constitutional protections, a brief exploration of three examples will illustrate
the extent to which they understood the concept of state constitutionalism and their level
of interest in establishing stronger protections at the state level. These examples include
the debate surrounding the extent to which the new constitution would guarantee freedom
of religion and prevent state support for religious institutions, the calls for an absolute
right to bear arms, and the successful campaign to extend all constitutional rights to
minors.26
Montana’s 1889 constitution contained a provision that prohibited any form of
direct or indirect public funding, aid, or support to any institution, educational or other,
which had a relationship of any form with any religion. As a result, there were no
legislative attempts to provide state aid to religious schools in Montana during the
twentieth century. However, the topic of state aid to religious schools had been
vigorously debated at the national level since the 1940s. Beginning in 1947, the Supreme
Court ruled in a series of cases on the constitutionality of the type and extent of state aid
to religious schools. The Court’s position was constantly evolving and somewhat
confusing, but by 1971 it had established that states could allow some forms of indirect
aid so long as the statute authorizing the aid in question had a secular purpose, that it
neither prohibited nor advanced religion, and that it did not promote “excessive
26

Two delegates in particular, Dorothy Eck and Lucile Speer, meticulously preserved
correspondence to them and their committees and made it available to the public by donating it to archives
in the state of Montana. Eck and Speer also donated their personal collections to Montana libraries, which
included varied documentation of the Montana Constitutional Convention. Dorothy Eck’s papers are
available at Dorothy Eck Papers, Record Group A-2, Boxes 1 – 5, Montana Historical Society Archives and
Library, Helena, MT (hereafter cited as, “Eck Papers, RG A-2, MHSL”); for information on Lucile Speer’s
papers see note 25.

56

entanglement” between government and religion. This last criterion was introduced in
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and, combined with a Congressional proposal to provide
federal aid for religious schools, resulted in heightened interest in and debate about public
aid to religious schools.27
The 1972 constitutional convention provided religious-education advocates with
an opportunity to change Montana’s constitution to the more permissive federal standard.
The resulting campaign sparked some of the most fervent debates of the convention and
highlighted Montanans’ understanding about the concept of state constitutionalism. Many
Montanans wrote the convention delegates about the topic. The debate centered on
whether to adopt the language of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution or to
maintain the stricter prohibition of the Montana Constitution. Proponents of adopting the
federal standard argued that since “excessive entanglement” between church and state
was prohibited by the federal Bill of Rights, it was unnecessary and unwise to go beyond
that standard. The Montana Catholic Conference advised the convention that “it is not
necessary to establish a double standard, and it is sufficient to follow the concise
provisions of the federal Constitution and its Amendments in this matter.” A petition
signed by twenty residents of a small southwestern Montana town urged the replacement
of the 1889 provision with the text of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.28
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Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Associated Press, “Dems Seek
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Reverend James H. Provost, Montana Catholic Conference, “Remarks to the Committee on the
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Opponents of state aid to religious institutions argued that the stronger Montana
standard better ensured religious liberty and that the federal standard was too permissive.
Floyd L. Rouse, a realtor from Great Falls, urged Dorothy Eck, the former statewide
president of the League of Women Voters, to maintain an absolute ban on state aid
because, unlike the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the existing language of
the 1889 provision was “so clear that it is extremely difficult to find a way of destroying
its true intent.” Norman D. Ostrander from Helena argued that the federal standards
meant some involvement of church and state was acceptable and “this cannot be
permitted if we are to provide the people with the security of freedom of religion.” A
petition signed by sixteen people, mostly from the small towns of Ovando and Helmville,
argued that the strong language of the existing constitution was the reason Montana’s
religious freedom protections were stronger than other states. These petitioners asked the
convention to maintain this level of protection and keep the absolute ban language in the
new constitution. The correspondence of both the proponents and opponents showed a
familiarity with the idea that states could go beyond federal protections, and the
opponents clearly advocated for a constitution that did so. Ultimately, the convention and
the voters agreed with the opponents regarding state funds and retained the 1889
provision mandating an absolute prohibition on state aid to religious institutions.

Language of the United States Constitution,” Box 2, Folder 10, Eck Papers, RG A-2, MHSL. For further
examples of the correspondence from proponents, see Mrs. Erwin Heschle to Delegate Dorothy Eck,
February 3, 1972, Box 3, Folder 6, Eck Papers, RG A-2, MHSL; Reverend David W. Konecny, Sacred
Heart Schools, to Dorothy Eck, February 2, 1972, Box 3, Folder 6, Eck Papers, RG A-2, MHSL.
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However, they slightly amended the original language and included a provision allowing
for the distribution of federal aid intended for non-public education.29
The right to bear arms was another topic that inspired numerous Montanans to
call for stronger protections at the state level than existed at the federal level. The 1889
Constitution included a provision guaranteeing the right of individuals to bear arms. At
the time, this was a more direct guarantee of an individual’s right to own a gun than
existed at the federal level because the Second Amendment had never been interpreted to
guarantee an individual, as opposed to a collective, right to bear arms. The rise of state
licensing laws caused distress among gun rights advocates who challenged these laws in
federal court. However, in 1969 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge to
New Jersey’s gun licensing law. This led to continued uncertainty about the individual
right to bear arms under the federal Constitution.30
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561 U.S. 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
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Gun rights advocates seized the opportunity of the constitutional convention to
ensure that the new constitution ensured the individual right to bear arms. They also
sought to prohibit firearms registration or licensing in the same provision. Proponents of
this proposal argued that banning licensing was necessary to guarantee the freedom to
own firearms and pointed out that the Montana Constitution was central to this freedom
given the status of the federal Amendment. These guns rights advocates were vocal,
attending numerous committee hearings. Despite their activism, ultimately the
convention simply maintained the individual right to bear arms, but did not extend it
further to prohibit licensing and registration. The adopted clause, Article III, Section 12
read:
The Right to Bear Arms. The right of any person to keep or
bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property,
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned,
shall not be called in question, but nothing herein contained
shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.31
The proposal, which was ultimately adopted, to extend all constitutional rights to
minors is another example of Montanans urging the convention to go beyond federal
protections. Indeed, advocates for this position appeared thrilled at the possibility of
Montana being the first state to adopt such a constitutional provision. In general, at the
federal and state levels, minors did not have the same constitutional rights as adults.
Juvenile courts operated under different rules than criminal courts for adults and did not
31
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February 14, 1972, Brown Collection, 71; Elmer B. Bertram to Leo Graybill, no date, RG 22, Box 1, Folder
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necessarily grant minors due process rights, such as the right to counsel, trial by jury, or
other criminal procedural rights. The extent of minors’ freedom of expression rights was
also unclear. The 1960s and 1970s saw significant student activism involving both minor
students and those above the age of majority. These politicized youth challenged
restrictions on their expression and other provisions denying them the rights of adults.
These challenges received varying levels of support and opposition from the courts and
lawmakers, leading to a body of law that was somewhat inconsistent. Rick Applegate’s
Bill of Rights dedicated a significant portion of the “New Provisions” chapter to
discussing the status of minor rights and potential new provisions to expand them. Child
advocates joined the discussion and, both as individuals and organizations, lobbied the
convention delegates to extend all constitutional rights to minors.32
On behalf of the Montana Advisory Council on Children and Youth and with the
assistance of Applegate, on January 13, 1972 Gerry Fenn proposed a clause guaranteeing
minors “all the fundamental rights of a Montana person.” Child advocates saw this
proposal as a way to protect minors from abuse. Student activists saw it as a way to
guarantee their participation in the political system. The constitutional novelty of such a
provision was widely remarked upon. Frank Sennett claimed that by adopting Fenn’s
proposed clause “Montana can serve as an example to the rest of this nation, and possibly
to other countries of the world, in their leadership in recognition of basic human rights
under Constitutional government.” Advocates collected the opinions of state and national
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child advocacy leaders on the proposal and highlighted their responses about the unique
nature of the proposal. The committee members were told that Isabella Jones of the
National Committee for Children and Youth though the proposal would be “unusual in a
state Constitution and certainly a breakthrough for children and youth.” Diane Hedin of
the University of Minnesota’s Center for Youth Development and Research told the
committee “no state constitution has anything specific relating to the rights of children
and youth.” The proponents of this proposal heavily emphasized the uniqueness of the
proposal and how it went beyond existing state or federal protections. This focus suggests
that Montanans were interested in having a constitution that contained new protections
independent of the federal Constitution. The delegates responded to the public advocacy
on this issue and included a provision, which read:
The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include,
but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article
unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the
protection of such persons.33

*

*

*

As this chapter has illustrated, the concept of state constitutionalism was deeply
intertwined into the debates on state constitutional revision. This was true for the
nationally disseminated scholarship on the topic. It was also true in Montana where the
33
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legal media, popular media, and members of the public advocated for a constitution that
protected individual rights much more stringently than the federal Constitution.
Convention delegates responded to this advocacy and wrote a constitution that
intentionally provided strong protections for individual rights. This new document, with
its rights provisions, provided the legal basis for court decisions in the 1970s and beyond
that established state-specific protections for individual rights that were stronger than
those at the federal level. The rights proposals discussed in this chapter were just some of
the many proposals for individual rights at the Montana Constitutional Convention. Two
other additions to Montana’s Declaration of Rights deserve a deeper investigation due to
their subsequent important role in Montana’s approach to state constitutionalism: the
privacy clause and the dignity clause. Exploring the history of these two clauses and how
they served as the basis for Montana’s embrace of state constitutionalism further proves
that citizen-driven constitutional revision was intimately connected to the birth of state
constitutionalism.
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Chapter 4: The Right of Privacy

The right to privacy is an excellent example of states adopting rights protections
that do not explicitly exist at the federal level. In Montana, and other states, a limited
right to privacy existed decades before the U.S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking
Griswold v. Connecticut case (1965) established a federal right to privacy. The right to
privacy was thoroughly discussed before and during the Montana Constitutional
Convention. The public communicated strong support for the concept, and the convention
intentionally adopted a privacy clause that went far beyond any contemporary
constitutional right to privacy. Montana’s privacy clause has, moreover, provided the
legal basis for several groundbreaking decisions utilizing state constitutionalism
principles. The history of the crafting, adoption, and interpretation of Montana’s privacy
clause shows the close connection between citizen-driven constitutional revision and the
rise of state constitutionalism.
The challenge of how to define and determine the extent of privacy rights was
first tackled by the convention’s Bill of Rights committee (BOR committee).1 Reflecting
on his experience at the convention, BOR committee member Bob Campbell, one of the
two lawyers on the committee, lamented the absence of a clearly worded right to privacy
at the federal level. “Because privacy is the essence of freedom,” he said, “it was my
hope to place it in the Montana Bill of Rights, even before I was elected as a delegate.”

1

Dennis E. Curran, “The Unbelievable Happened,” Billings Gazette, February 17, 1972, Brown
Collection, 84, University of Montana William J. Jameson Law Library, accessed online at
http://www.umt.edu/law/library/Research%20Tools/State%20Pages/MontanaConstitution/default.htm
(hereafter cited as Brown Collection); Gary Langley, “Individual Rights Prime Concern of Delegates,”
Missoulian, February 9, 1972, Brown Collection, 53.
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Campbell was eccentric and earnest; he was well liked by his fellow delegates because of
his warmth and humor, often joking to relieve tension on the convention floor. His
engaging nature may have contributed to his fellow committee members’ and delegates’
willingness to support his deeply engrained commitment to the concept of a right to
privacy. The history of the right to privacy in Montana also shows that the concept of
privacy was intimately connected with protections regarding search and seizure law.2 As
a result, in order to capture the intentions of the delegates regarding privacy it is essential
to study the debates surrounding two sections of the Declaration of Rights: section
eleven, the search and seizure clause, and section ten, the privacy clause.3
The first area in which this focus on privacy rights became evident was in the
debate regarding the nature and scope of the new search and seizure clause. On January
21, 1972, Campbell submitted a proposal, Delegate Proposal (DP) # 14, to amend the
existing search and seizure clause to prohibit electronic monitoring without a warrant.
This proposal was supported by other members of the Bill of Rights Committee,

2

In addition to the search and seizure clause and the privacy clause, the right to privacy was at the
center of the debate on another unique provision of Montana’s constitution: the right to know clause. This
clause, both as proposed and adopted, guaranteed Montanans the right to access government records and
meetings. However, it contained an exception to this right “in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.” 1972 Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 9.
The press and some members of the public strongly opposed this privacy exception and an intense debate
raged on the topic, mostly driven by members of the press and the Montana Press Association.
Unfortunately, space limitations prohibit a thorough examination of this additional aspect of the Montana
Constitutional Convention’s interest in a right to privacy.
3
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including Dorothy Eck and Jerome Cate. The existing 1889 clause mirrored the federal
Fourth Amendment and read:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or seize
any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, reduced to writing.
Campbell’s DP # 14 would have amended the section to read:
The people shall be secure in their persons,
papers, homes, and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures, invasions of privacy, and no warrant to search any place, utilize
electronic or other means to intercept oral or other communications, or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, reduced to writing.4
On February 8, 1972 the BOR committee met to review and discuss the existing
bill of rights and the proposals that committee members and other delegates had for a
new bill. Campbell proposed adding the following statement to DP # 14 to further clarify
his intended restrictions on electronic surveillance: “Any interception of communications
must be authorized by a court of record.” The committee supported the proposal and
Campbell’s amendment and quickly agreed to incorporate them as the new search and
seizure clause. This proposal and its subsequent treatment by the convention delegates

4

Bob Campbell, excerpt from unpublished manuscript sent via email February 19, 2010, in
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reflected what appears to have been a real concern among Montanans regarding
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.5
This concern was not sudden, nor was it limited to the few Montanans serving on
the Bill of Rights committee. Bob Campbell and the BOR committee were responding, as
citizens of a state that had long sought to protect privacy and limit governmental search
and seizure powers, to high-profile developments at the federal and state level regarding
wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and search warrants.6
At the federal level, electronic surveillance and its relationship to search and
seizure protections had been an issue since the 1920s. The matter first came before the
U.S. Supreme Court during Prohibition in Olmstead v. United States (1928). In 1919, the
United States ratified the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
prohibited the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” and gave both
Congress and the states the power to enforce prohibition through legislation. Congress
followed up by passing the Volstead Act, which provided for mechanisms to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment. There was widespread resistance to Prohibition, and, as a result,
both the federal government and the states sought new ways to gather evidence against
5

Campbell’s proposal would have required a warrant for electronic surveillance. Other delegates
wanted an explicit ban on electronic surveillance written into the constitution. Delegate Dorothy Eck
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bootleggers who refused to comply with restrictions on the manufacturing and sale of
alcohol. The Olmstead case presented the question of whether wiretapping without a
warrant was a constitutionally valid way for prosecutors to gather evidence, and, if it was
not, whether the evidence could be used against the defendant. In a narrow reading of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court held that wiretaps constituted neither a search nor a
seizure. This was because a wiretap did not involve physically searching or entering
one’s home, office, or other location or physically seizing documents or physical
evidence. Moreover, because the Court did not define wiretapping as a search or seizure,
the Fourth Amendment protections requiring a warrant based on probable cause did not
apply.7
Justice Brandeis dissented vigorously in the Olmstead case. He argued that the
Court’s reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was too narrow and called for a
broad application of the underlying principles of the Amendments. In what is widely
contended to be the first Supreme Court dissent to promote the idea of a right to privacy,
Justice Brandeis argued that the authors of the Constitution “sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.” “They conferred, as
against the Government,” Brandeis added, “the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.” Justice Brandeis

7
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added that, “To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.” His argument that wiretapping violated an individual’s right
to privacy was quickly embraced by civil libertarians, and some federal law makers,
among them Montana’s junior U.S. Senator, Burton K. Wheeler.8
In the early 1930s there were various measures regarding wiretapping—some
seeking to authorize the practice and others to prohibit it—proposed in Congress. The
flurry of legislative activity regarding wiretapping reflected, in part, reactions to the
Olmstead decision, the growth of organized crime, and advances in technology. A
number of proposals to explicitly authorize wiretapping in certain situations passed the
House but failed in the Senate. Senator Wheeler, informed by his experiences in Montana
as U.S. Attorney during World War I, the opinions of his constituents, and his personal
commitment to civil liberties, went out of his way to get legislation authorizing
wiretapping assigned to his committee in order to ensure it would fail to pass the Senate.9
After years of contention on the matter, Congress passed the Electronic Communications
Act of 1934, which, in Section 605, ostensibly prohibited unauthorized wiretapping of

8
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phone lines. Over the next thirty-five years, federal law, policy, and practice regarding
wiretapping were far from consistent. In Nardone v. United States (1937) the Supreme
Court held that evidence obtained through wiretapping in violation of Section 605 of the
Electronic Communications Act could not be used as evidence against a defendant.
Despite this ruling, the federal government continued to use wiretapping in their
investigations, leading to continual disagreement over how evidence against defendants
had been obtained and whether it was admissible in court. Additionally, the Supreme
Court allowed the use of other means of electronic surveillance, such as wired informants
and detectaphones—devices which enhanced hearing but did not physically invade the
suspect’s home or office.10
A pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases in 1967 sought to streamline previous
interpretations of the constitutionality of various electronic surveillance devices and to
definitively determine whether a warrant was needed in order to use evidence gathered by
such devices. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the concept of a right to privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment and defined the issue of constitutionality and electronic
surveillance for contemporaries of the Montana Constitutional Convention delegates. In
Berger v. New York (1967) the Court invalidated a New York state law allowing
electronic surveillance without meeting the warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The case involved the placing of a recording device inside of a bar owner’s
10
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office in order to gather evidence of a conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the New York
State Liquor Authority. The Court held that the electronic surveillance invaded an
individual’s right to privacy and that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments required
certain criteria be met in order to justify governmental invasions of privacy. The Court
set forth three criteria that the government must meet in order to use evidence gained
through electronic surveillance against a defendant: 1) court authorization, 2) probable
cause, and 3) immediate need.11
The second case, Katz v. United States (1967), involved a wiretap which had been
placed by the FBI on a public pay phone in order to gather evidence against an individual
who was suspected of illegal gambling. In the Katz decision, the Court overturned the
1928 Olmstead decision by rejecting the idea that the Fourth Amendment required
invasion of a particular space:

The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance. 12

11

The U.S. Supreme Court had announced a general right to privacy, which protected individuals
from state as well as federal actions, two years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut, a case that will be
thoroughly discussed later. This right to privacy was based, in part, on the Fourth Amendment; Berger v.
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Because these two decisions created new expectations of law enforcement and
altered the manner in which Section 605 of the 1934 Electronic Communications Act
could be applied, Congress responded with legislation addressing the issue: Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title III required detailed
procedures be developed and adopted prior to law enforcement embarking on electronic
surveillance. Most notably, it also defined who could engage in electronic surveillance, a
list that included certain state officials—with state legislative approval—such as the
Attorney General, and County and City Attorneys.13
This federal recognition of the potential wiretap authority of state officials in the
Omnibus Crime Bill is where the federal background on wiretapping, search and seizure,
and the right to privacy intersects with Montana’s history. Article III, Section 7 of
Montana’s existing 1889 constitution mirrored the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.14 Montana court cases interpreting this clause, and applying the Fourth
Amendment, resulted in many similar conclusions to those announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court. For example, in a decision reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Weeks v. United States (1914), the Montana Supreme Court in State ex rel.
King v. District Court (1924) held that evidence obtained without a valid search warrant
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had to be excluded from a defendant’s trial. This case also involved a search without a
warrant for evidence of bootlegging.15
Despite some similar applications of constitutional search and seizure protections,
there were a number of ways in which, even before the 1972 constitution, Montana
required a higher level of protection from police searches and seizures than did federal
law. This bias toward individual privacy, when juxtaposed with governmental
investigation into one’s home or personal affairs, reflected the cultural importance of
privacy in Montana. A pair of cases decided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1968
encapsulates both Montana’s historical protection of privacy and the legal and the
political mood that was prevalent in Montana leading up to the constitutional convention.
The two cases, State v. Langan and State v. Kurland, involved the search of Mary
Langan’s home in Bozeman, where Sandra Kurland lived as Langan’s roommate, and the
seizure of marijuana, which resulted in the police arresting the two women. The search
was authorized by a warrant issued by a justice of the peace and was based on
information from an undercover informant that there was marijuana present in Langan
and Kurland’s residence. The women were convicted of violating the state’s Uniform
Drug Act, based in large part on the court’s admission of the seized marijuana as
evidence against them in their trial. The Montana Supreme Court overturned their
convictions for two reasons. First, it said that the search violated the Uniform Drug Act
because it “absolutely prohibits the issuance of a search warrant to search a private
residence for narcotics.” This prohibition, which was enacted along with the general laws
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governing narcotics in Montana in 1937, reflected a reverence for privacy. The strong
ban on searching a home for narcotics, even with a warrant, suggests that the legislators
who passed the Act prioritized the sanctity of an individual’s home and, arguably, even
considered the decision to possess and use narcotics in one’s home a private decision.
The second reason the Court gave for overturning the convictions was the long-standing
exclusionary rule, which prohibited evidence gained through an illegal search from being
used at trial. The Court reaffirmed Montana’s commitment to this principle and pointed
to the recent decision in Mapp v. Ohio, in which the U.S. Supreme Court had extended
the federal exclusionary rule to states. These two cases reflected a contemporary legal
community that prioritized individual privacy over “law and order,” as well as the
endurance of high legal standards favoring individual privacy in Montana.16
The debate over state and federal wiretap authority overlapped with Montana’s
concern for privacy and the expectation of limited governmental search and seizure
authority that the Langan and Kurland cases illustrated. The legal community in Montana
had engaged in discussions on electronic surveillance throughout the 1960s and
encouraged lawmakers to adopt statutes banning the practice. Local newspapers
published articles and editorials supporting moves to limit wiretapping and other forms of
electronic surveillance in Montana. Legislators responded to these calls, and by 1971
Montana had adopted a number of statutes prohibiting the government from engaging in
electronic surveillance and disclosure of information obtained through electronic
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surveillance. This meant state officials could not obtain a warrant for any form of
electronic surveillance.17
The courts also limited the use of any form of electronic surveillance. In 1971 the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that information obtained by a third party through
electronic surveillance, without the defendant’s consent, violated the search and seizure
clause of the state constitution and the defendant’s right to privacy inherent in that
provision. In this case, State v. Brecht, the third party electronic surveillance consisted of
the sister of a murder victim testifying about a telephone conversation she had listened in
on, on another line, between the victim and the defendant, in which the defendant
threatened to shoot the victim. Within hours of the telephone call in question, the victim
had been shot by the defendant in the bar in which she worked; the defendant claimed the
shooting was accidental. The combination of the Montana Supreme Court rulings in
Brecht and State ex rel. King, and the various state statutes regarding electronic
surveillance, resulted in a firm prohibition against state and local law enforcement
officials gathering information, or using information gathered, through any form of
electronic surveillance. 18
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill’s provisions allowing state and local officials, if
authorized by the state legislature, to engage in electronic surveillance with a warrant
were in stark contrast to the values reflected in Montana’s engrained practice of
protecting individual privacy rights against unlawful searches and seizures and resistance
17
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to any electronic surveillance measures. During the 1971 Legislative Session, a proposal
was introduced to authorize state and local officials, in line with the Omnibus Crime Bill,
to engage in electronic surveillance with a warrant. The measure failed, but the debate
surrounding it raised the profile of the issue and inspired a strong backlash among many
Montanans.19
At the beginning of February 1972, when the BOR Committee quickly agreed to
Bob Campbell’s DP # 14 on electronic surveillance, this history regarding search and
seizure law, electronic surveillance, and its relationship to a right to privacy was well
known to Campbell and the other delegates. A lawyer practicing civil rights and
constitutional law, Campbell was intricately aware of the legal issues surrounding
electronic surveillance. Wade Dahood, the committee chair and an attorney who was
widely expected to run for governor following the convention, regularly argued before
the Montana Supreme Court and was thoroughly aware of this context. The rest of the
committee had varying backgrounds and familiarity with privacy law. Moreover, the Bill
of Rights report prepared by Rick Applegate, the young research analyst assigned to the
BOR committee, provided them with extensive background on relevant issues regarding
civil liberties, constitutional law, history, and recent constitution-making. It summarized
the above discussion in some detail, laid out contemporary areas of concern, and
provided examples of other states’ constitutional provisions regarding search and seizure
and electronic surveillance. The earliest meetings of the BOR Committee involved
reviewing this document and discussing the issues and suggestions it contained. By the
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seventh meeting of the BOR Committee, when Campbell made his proposal, the
committee members were very familiar with the legal, philosophical, and constitutional
issues Applegate’s report addressed.20
The committee held a number of hearings to solicit the opinions of the public on
the BOR proposals, and news of the convention was prominent in newspapers across the
state. This provided ample opportunity for public reaction to the convention’s proposals.
The public discussion regarding Campbell’s DP # 14 reflected the importance—to the
Montana public and the constitutional convention delegates—of protecting an
individual’s right to privacy. Dorothy Eck, a BOR Committee member and delegate from
Bozeman commented that all the delegates to the convention, including Republicans and
Democrats, “liked being recognized as populists.” Given the public reception to
proposals protecting an individual right to privacy, such as the proposed restriction on
electronic surveillance, and the outcome of those proposals, the delegates were indeed
populists. Testimony at public hearings was overwhelmingly in opposition to electronic
surveillance and often urged the BOR Committee to adopt even stronger protections,
such as an absolute ban on electronic surveillance.21
Testimony on the topic included the views of organized groups, individual
citizens, and elected officials. There was no organized support for electronic surveillance.
The Montana Sheriffs and Peace Officers’ Association (MSPO) did not take a position,
20
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and individual members of law enforcement did not testify. A fellow delegate, J. Mason
Melvin reported to the Bill of Rights committee that he had attended an MSPO meeting,
and some of the attendees conveyed an interest in being allowed to utilize electronic
surveillance in major crimes investigations, but all supported being required to get a
warrant. Everyone else who testified or communicated with the committee expressed
discomfort with electronic surveillance. Some supported Campbell’s DP # 14, but most
people who testified or wrote their delegates urged them to go further and include an
absolute ban on electronic surveillance in the constitution. Mrs. Irving Boettger, a
homeowner in East Helena, appeared before the committee as “a private citizen
expressing a personal opinion, not as a representative of any group” to share her belief
that: “We can hardly feel like free citizens in a free state if we can never know when we
are being intruded upon.” She urged the committee to limit all forms of electronic
surveillance to law enforcement and then “only under extremely rigid legal and judicial
controls.” On February 15, the Montana AFL-CIO voiced their support for the intent
behind the proposal. However, they wanted the committee to go further and suggested
inserting “an absolute ban on ‘any interception of private communication’. . . into the
section.” Delegate Dorothy Eck received several letters from a constituent urging her to
support a prohibition on wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Responding to the
practice of the FBI monitoring activist groups, a group of citizens from Missoula
submitted a signed petition that asserted: “Unfettered government surveillance is a
powerful threat to the existence of democratic institutions.” This petition specifically
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called for “stronger guarantees” regarding surveillance than were present in the federal
Bill of Rights.22
Tom Towe, a Democratic representative from Billings, testified extensively
throughout February and March on the right to privacy and the search and seizure
proposal. He suggested an absolute bar on intercepting communications, while
acknowledging that under national law federal officials could engage in electronic
surveillance within Montana. Kayle Jackson of Browning agreed with Towe and urged
the committee to adopt an absolute ban on electronic surveillance because, “If people
believe that their government may be listening to everything they say, it would seem
certain to keep them from saying anything, which is not what a democracy is all about.”
The consistency of support for prohibiting electronic surveillance among a diverse
representation of the public, and the absence of public testimony in favor of electronic
surveillance, reflected the strong public support for constitutional provisions protecting
an individual right to privacy.23
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The Bill of Rights committee stripped the provision addressing electronic
surveillance from its final proposal on the search and seizure clause before it was
submitted to the full convention on February 19, 1972. This directly reflected public
pressure on the BOR committee to strengthen the provision or to ban electronic
surveillance outright. Reporting on the last public hearing before the communication
interception proposal was withdrawn, the Great Falls Tribune noted that multiple
attorneys testified that they feared “the section would have the effect of authorizing
wiretapping and bugging,” which conflicted with existing Montana law. In addition to the
attorneys, the paper reported that multiple witnesses “pressed for a stronger section
banning illegal wiretapping during the four-hour hearing.” Many of those who testified
argued that, since electronic surveillance was currently illegal in Montana, DP #14 could
have the effect of legalizing the practice because it stated that a warrant was required to
engage in electronic surveillance. In response, the committee removed the language
regarding electronic surveillance from the proposal in order not to inadvertently authorize
it. By withdrawing the proposal, the Committee believed it was acting in the interest of
individual privacy and, certainly, responding to overwhelming public sentiment. 24
This decision was debated and rehashed in some detail once the proposal reached
the full convention on March 7, 1972. The debate highlights just how crucial the concept
of a right to privacy was to the delegates and how resistant Montanans were to electronic
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surveillance. In an attempt to explain why they had removed the earlier language
Campbell told the convention delegates: “We at the committee felt very strongly that the
people of Montana should be protected as much as possible against eavesdropping,
electronic surveillance, and such type of activity.” Despite this assurance about the
meaning of the search and seizure clause, a number of delegates had concerns that
electronic surveillance would be allowed.25
Mae Nan Robinson, the youngest delegate to the convention and a graduate
student at the University of Montana, attacked the committee’s decision to omit language
explicitly dealing with electronic surveillance. She proposed amending the clause to
prohibit the interception of any communications. In support for her amendment, she
referred to extensive statistics regarding the cost and futility of electronic surveillance,
the analysis of contemporary legal scholars on privacy and communications, and Justice
Brandeis’s impassioned defense of a right to privacy in his Olmstead dissent. She ended
her plea with the strong assertion that “no case has been or can be made for wiretapping
in the state of Montana” and further stated that wiretapping reflected “a blatant disregard
for the privacy of individuals.” No one stood to oppose the concept of prohibiting
wiretapping and no one rejected an individual’s right to privacy. However, there was
opposition to her amendment, which centered on concerns about the broadness of its
language. Some delegates expressed concern that a ban on intercepting any
communication would go beyond prohibiting wiretapping and also prohibit investigations
into obscene calls and other phone-based harassment and prohibit prison officials from
monitoring non-privileged communications to and from incarcerated individuals. In the
25
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end, the language of the clause was slightly revised and collective assurances were made
that neither the committee nor the convention as a whole intended to authorize or allow
electronic surveillance.26
The evolution of the committee’s search and seizure proposal is a clear example
of the public demanding stronger protections for individual rights than existed at the
federal level. This public demand resulted in a constitutional clause with the clear intent
of protecting individual privacy. This clause, in combination with the right to privacy, has
resulted in strong protections for individual rights in Montana’s criminal law.27
The concept of a right to privacy was not limited to notions regarding government
intrusion through searches or electronic surveillance. The delegates, and the people of
Montana, held a broader conception of privacy, which was reflected in the parallel
proposal for a stand-alone right to privacy. Bob Campbell submitted his initial proposal,
Delegate Proposal # 33, guaranteeing a right to privacy almost upon arrival at the
convention on January 26, 1972. It initially read:
The rights of individual dignity, privacy, and free expression being essential to the
well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe upon these rights without
the showing of a compelling state interest.
This broad concept of privacy, related to concepts of freedom and quality of life,
reflected legal developments at both the national and state level.28
In 1890, Louis D. Brandeis, future U.S. Supreme Court Justice, and Samuel D.
Warren wrote a Harvard Law Review article that was widely considered to be one of the
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earliest articulations of the concept of a right to privacy. In this article, Brandeis and
Warren argued that a right to privacy had always existed within the common law; it was,
they maintained, generally submerged within an individual’s property rights. The
changing nature of society and the growth of technology, Brandeis and Warren asserted,
had changed the ways that privacy was being invaded. For example, technology allowed
for photographs of an individual to be easily reproduced and circulated without
permission, a harm that was not adequately addressed under existing property rights in
the common law. Brandeis and Warren called for the law to evolve and for the courts to
apply the principle underlying common law property protections—that individuals had “a
right to be let alone”—to a variety of non-property based violations of privacy. To ensure
this right, Brandeis and Warren proposed “a general right to privacy for thoughts,
emotions, and sensations expressed by an individual.”29
The Fourth Amendment concepts of search and seizure, addressing the invasion
of government into an individual’s private space, were the first areas of constitutional law
to gravitate towards a right to privacy. Despite the far-reaching implications of the
Brandeis and Warren article, the concept of a more general constitutional right to privacy
was somewhat slow to be adopted. The early cases regarding a right to privacy reflected
Brandeis and Warren’s argument for a right to privacy within the common law and,
except for the search and seizure/wiretap issue, were mostly civil cases involving tort
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law. Based on the interpretations of the prominent Judge Thomas M. Cooley, privacy
rights came to be reflected in four torts:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.

States embraced the concept of a right to privacy much earlier than the federal
government; between the 1930s and the 1960s most states in the country recognized
some form of a right to privacy in tort law. 30
The 1950s and 1960s saw an explosion of scholarship on the concept of a right to
privacy and the debate regarding its breadth. During this time, legal scholars such as Alan
Westin lamented growing intrusions into individuals’ private lives. Westin believed that
invasions of privacy were increasing in frequency and scope in part because of advances
in technology, but also because of a growing culture of surveillance and information
gathering, driven by both private and governmental interests. Legal scholars’ increased
focus on and recognition of a broad right to privacy challenged the status quo in federal
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constitutional and statutory law, which continued to limit the right to privacy to search
and seizure-type matters until 1965.31
That year federal constitutional law underwent a massive change with the finding
of a right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut. The Griswold case involved a
Connecticut statute which prohibited the dissemination of contraceptives, or information
about them. Two prominent doctors challenged the law on behalf of their married patients
who were seeking birth control. The Court held that access to information about
contraceptives and decisions between married couples regarding contraceptive use fell
within a protected marital right to privacy. A right to privacy, marital or otherwise, is not
explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution. Writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice William Douglas asserted that this right was contained in the “penumbras,”
or shadows, of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Basing their
reasoning on precedent and the underlying principles behind the aforementioned
Amendments, the Court stated that the Bill of Rights recognized a “zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.” This zone of privacy included
a right to privacy in association, of which, the Court said, marriage was the most
fundamental. The Court’s recognition of this zone of marital privacy was reminiscent of
the first of the four privacy torts described by Judge Cooley. Additionally, the Court said
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected this right from state as well
as federal action. Significantly, while many disagreed with it, this decision elevated the
right to privacy to the level of the most fundamental rights in the United States. This
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decision, and the announcement of a federal constitutional right to privacy, led to a series
of cases in which attorneys argued that state laws or actions violated individuals’ right to
privacy. For example, at the time of the Montana Constitutional Convention a number of
cases, including Doe v. Bolton and Roe v. Wade, were working their way up to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the newly announced right to privacy encompassed a
woman’s right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.32
The debate surrounding a right to privacy was neither limited to the federal level,
nor was it new to Montana. In 1972 the majority of states embraced the concept of a right
to privacy through their courts, though generally it was limited in scope. Two states,
Arizona and Washington, had limited privacy rights protected by their constitution. The
year of Montana’s constitutional convention, Alaska amended its constitution to include a
fairly broad right to privacy. Prior to the convention, Montana embraced the concept of a
constitutional right to privacy largely through search and seizure cases, as discussed
above. However, like many states, the Montana Supreme Court had been faced with the
question of whether a right to privacy existed in tort law. The first time this question
arose was in Bennett v. Gusdorf (1935), where a young woman sued a photographer for
publically displaying her photograph without her consent; she argued this was a violation
of her right to privacy. The court acknowledged that some jurisdictions had
32
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acknowledged the existence of a common-law right to privacy but passed on the question
of whether this right existed under Montana law. Instead, the court held that the actions
of the photographer violated the contract he had with the young woman. 33
In 1952 the Montana Supreme Court firmly embraced the concept of a right to
privacy in tort cases in Welsh v. Roehm et al. The case involved a landlord who moved
into his tenant’s apartment without permission, refused to leave, and harassed and
generally interrupted the family’s normal life. The decision was notable because of the
strong language the court used in upholding a right to privacy that could be protected
from intrusions. This case, in combination with the tenor of Montana’s search and seizure
protections, resulted in a right to privacy that was protected to some extent from both
private and governmental intrusions. The language used by the state supreme court in
State v. Brecht (1971), the case which excluded testimony regarding an overheard
telephone conversation, reaffirmed the ruling in Welsh v. Roehm and hinted at the
existence of a broad privacy right. While the Montana courts had embraced the concept
in tort law and search and seizure law, in 1972 there was no explicit right to privacy in
Montana’s statutes or constitution. 34
The tenuous nature of both the federal and state right to privacy was very clear to
the staff and delegates at the convention. The background materials provided to BOR
committee members on the right to privacy included an overview of the philosophical
and legal writings on the topic, the few applicable court cases, and an overview of
Montana’s privacy law. The materials discussed the controversy surrounding the right to
33
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privacy at the federal level and its potential impermanence. In his Bill of Rights
document, Rick Applegate warned:
There is considerable dissension over the recent period of judicial activism on the
part of the Warren Court and its alleged circumvention of the principles of
federalism in its extension of federal civil liberties protections to bind the states.
Of course, this means that the federal Court's status as primary guardian of civil
liberties may be only temporary—or at least that it may not be definitive.
Borrowing heavily from Westin, a leading advocate for establishing a broad right to
privacy, Applegate urged the Committee to protect associational, communicative, and
personal privacy. He also presented extensive information on the reasons state
constitutions should go beyond federal protections. Two of these reasons in particular
were consistent with state constitutionalism advocates. First, he argued that leaving the
protection of civil liberties to the federal government encouraged more intrusion into the
states by the national government. Second, he asserted that, given the conservative
opposition to newly upheld rights such as the right to privacy, the likelihood of continued
protection of these rights was tenuous. 35
The BOR Committee also received correspondence that expressed concern about
a shift in the Supreme Court’s philosophy on constitutional interpretation and argued that
it was now the role of “state constitutions to make certain individual rights are
safeguarded.” The constitutional convention delegates were urged, both by staff and by
many in the public, to adopt stronger protections for civil liberties, and explicitly the right
to privacy, than existed at the federal level. The Butte newspaper, The Montana
Standard, editorialized that a right to privacy was necessary because times had changed
35
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as a result of technology, because government had expanded its reach, and because
corporations had increased their intervention in individuals’ lives. The Standard noted
that the federal Constitution and the existing 1889 Montana constitution provided
inadequate protections against intrusions into one’s privacy, but that the convention could
remedy this by adopting a strong privacy clause.36
The BOR committee accepted this challenge and eventually put forth a proposal
that sought to cement the tenuous right to privacy in a way that reflected contemporary
thinking on the topic. The legal and philosophical background behind the movement to
grant broad privacy rights was evident in Bob Campbell’s initial proposal # 33 regarding
“the right of individual dignity, privacy, and expression.” Numerous newspaper articles
applauded this proposal for expanding individuals’ protection against government
interference. Additionally, delegates communicated to their constituents regarding the
proposal in a supportive manner.37
The proposal, however, did not last long in its original form. The Style and
Drafting Committee argued that it contained too many distinct and different rights and
needed to be broken up into separate proposals for each distinct right. Campbell
responded by breaking up his proposal into two different proposals; he felt that a pre-
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existing proposal (DP # 61) guaranteeing equal rights and individual dignity addressed
the portion of his original proposal guaranteeing a right to dignity. He amended the free
speech clause to include a right of expression. Finally, he drafted the proposal for a right
to privacy that would ultimately be adopted by the Convention. Campbell subsequently
said he “wanted to state it as absolute as possible but still have room for recognizing
situations where the state could enter a private home for such emergencies as fighting a
fire or a call to stop violence toward an adult or child needing immediate protection.” As
there were only a few examples of privacy clauses in other state constitutions, all of
which Campbell found too permissive, he had to turn to other sources for inspiration.
Campbell has said that he “used the pattern in the right to bear arms in the Second
Amendment by making a statement that could not be questioned and then state the right
with the highest possible standard for court review.” As of February 3, 1972 the final
product read: “The right of privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”38
Direct public response to any of the specific proposals was minimal. Support for
the general concept of a right to privacy, however, was fairly extensive. Concerns
regarding individual privacy were pervasive throughout the testimony before the BOR
Committee. H.R. Williams wrote the Missoula delegation to share his belief that “We
need a strong bill of rights, especially concerning the rights of individual dignity, privacy,
38
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freedom of expression, and a clean environment.” Much of the testimony and
correspondence reflected the type of concerns about growing technology, private and
governmental, expressed by Alan Westin and Rick Applegate. Testifying before the BOR
Committee on January 26, 1972, Journalist Daniel Foley commented about the right to
privacy:
The Committee is very concerned about the right of privacy, and well that you
should be in this era of credit checks and computer banks, wiretaps and bugging
devices, and military spying on those exercising their rights of free speech and
assembly.39
Tom Towe, a representative from Billings, was as close to an opponent of
Campbell’s proposal as existed. He submitted multiple alternative proposals for a right to
privacy, all which sought to define in significantly more detail exactly what a right to
privacy would protect. Towe’s proposals sought to define three areas where privacy
would be protected: “home and other physical areas,” “communications,” and “the
mind.” Towe’s proposals, while asserting that since the Griswold decision “everyone has
assumed that privacy is essential and must be protected,” would leave out:
[P]eripheral claims which, in my opinion, are more properly described as freedom
to control one’s body, freedom to act in any manner that does not interfere with
another and freedom from bureaucratic harassment—quite separate notions. 40
The “peripheral claims” which Towe’s proposal would leave out were of
particular importance to scholars such as Westin, and, more importantly, to Bob
Campbell, the clause’s author. Campbell’s February 3, 1972, speech introducing his right
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to privacy proposal was clearly influenced by Brandeis and Warren’s early advocacy of a
“right to be let alone,” Westin’s advocacy for a broad privacy right that encompassed a
variety of personal interactions and information, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s embrace
of a right to access and use birth control, as well as other forms of controlling one’s body.
Campbell wanted the broadest and most absolute privacy right possible but one that
would still acknowledge that “there are areas of legitimate state interest and these areas
may affect an individual’s right to privacy.” Campbell was not alone in his support for
the broadest privacy clause that could be applied in a practical manner, and no one on the
BOR committee made an attempt to substitute Towe’s more limited right to privacy for
Campbell’s broad proposal. Indeed, the committee wholeheartedly endorsed Campbell’s
proposal, adopting it on February 8, 1972. 41
The press reported that the BOR committee’s proposed Bill of Rights generally
expanded individual rights. The right to privacy was almost universally commented on in
these newspaper articles, with varying levels of explanation regarding its extent and
potential effects. It was portrayed to the public in the Helena Independent Record as
protecting “individuals from harassment by the state in so-called ‘victimless crimes’
where nobody is hurt.” The Missoulian reported that the right to privacy could guarantee
that “welfare recipients would not, for example, be required to answer ‘embarrassing’
personal questions when applying for welfare.” Despite these potentially radical
interpretations of the right to privacy, visible opposition was limited to Tom Towe, who
simply wanted a slightly less extensive right to privacy, albeit one that would not extend
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to the soon-to-be more controversial aspects of a right to privacy reflected in Roe v. Wade
or Griswold. Delegates reported to their constituents that privacy concerns had dominated
the BOR committee hearings, yet there is no evidence of constituents or the public
expressing dissatisfaction with this focus. 42
The embrace of a broad right to privacy followed the proposal from the BOR
Committee to the convention floor. Bob Campbell recalls that when the proposed
Declaration of Rights article was introduced on March 7, 1972 to the full convention, the
section on the right to privacy “received the strongest support of any in the Declaration of
Rights article.” Regardless of party membership or liberal or conservative philosophical
ideology, the delegates supported the concept of a right to privacy: Campbell noted that
“No one rose to speak against it.” This apparently unanimous support for a right to
privacy was an example of the phenomenon of the political right and left agreeing on an
outcome for somewhat different reasons. While conservatives and liberals in the
convention embraced the idea of a “right to be let alone,” it seems that they had different
ideas about what constituted intrusions on this right. The more liberal delegates and staff
expressed particular concerns regarding police misconduct, and the potential for state
laws prohibiting abortion and contraception. Conservative delegates and citizens
expressed concerns regarding big government and the increasing scope of governmental
powers. There were shared concerns, however; individuals from both political ideologies
expressed fear of technological developments and government intrusion, such as
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wiretapping. Additionally, no one argued with the interpretations of the other delegates.
For example, when Bob Campbell, on the convention floor, discussed the Griswold case
and how the right to privacy was used to allow access to birth control as a reason why the
clause should be adopted, none of the more conservative delegates voiced opposition to
such applications of Montana’s right to privacy clause. 43
Surprisingly, once the clause had been introduced on the floor of the convention,
Helena delegate George Harper, an Independent and an ordained Minister, proposed
striking the provision allowing for invasion of privacy with a compelling interest. He
wanted an absolute right to privacy. He appeared to believe the search and seizure clause
should, and did, provide the only acceptable purpose for invading individual privacy.
Surprised, Bob Campbell agreed and the convention passed the proposed amendment.
Later on, Tom Ask, a delegate and former county attorney, approached Campbell and
said he intended to propose an amendment reinserting “without the showing of a
compelling state interest.” Law enforcement officials and organizations had expressed
concerns that an absolute right to privacy would conflict with the search and seizure
clause and prohibit any and all search warrants. Campbell communicated with the
professor of constitutional law at the University of Montana, Larry Elison, regarding the
absolute right to privacy. Elison believed that even though the convention had stripped
out the compelling interest provision the courts would balk at applying an absolute right.
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Based on this discussion and Tom Ask’s discussions with law enforcement, the next day
Campbell supported the reinsertion of the compelling interest provision. Ask and
Campbell informed the convention that Harper’s amendment had been adopted hastily
because the concept of an absolute right to privacy was so appealing to the delegates.
They shared the concerns of law enforcement and Professor Elison’s analysis with the
convention. The proposed amendment easily passed the convention on March 8, 1972
after Campbell and Ask explained their reasoning.44
The proposed Montana constitution now had an explicit and far-reaching right to
privacy, which offered a strong guarantee of protection for a right that had just recently
been recognized at the federal level. Indeed, Montana’s provision was designed to go
beyond the federal privacy right and to establish the most protection for privacy of any
state in the country. Members of the Montana public had encouraged the delegates to
guarantee strong protections for privacy. Their advocacy and the actions of the
convention are clear examples of the role that constitutional revision played in
establishing the legal basis for state constitutionalism.
According to legal scholar Patricia Cain, “the state of Montana created the strongest
protection for privacy rights of any state in this country.” Without the efforts of the
Montanans and delegates responsible for this clause, it would have been very difficult for
future judges to argue that Montana’s constitution protected privacy at a higher level than
the federal Constitution. In reality however, this clause, often in combination with the
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dignity clause, would be used by attorneys and the courts to protect individual rights in
Montana at a level that went well beyond the federal Bill of Rights.45
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Chapter 5: Individual Dignity
The Montana Constitutional Convention delegates’ interest in creating a
foundational document that protected individual rights at an unprecedented level resulted
in numerous provisions that went beyond the protections in the federal Bill of Rights. In
addition to the far-reaching privacy clause, the convention adopted a section that included
both a broad anti-discrimination provision and an equal protection clause. This section of
the Montana Declaration of Rights, entitled “Individual Dignity,” has been lauded by
legal scholars as “novel” and as a unique “approach to ‘equal protection’ and nondiscrimination law.” It is an excellent example of how the values and mores of the midtwentieth century influenced the advocates for state constitutional revision and state
constitutionalism. The individual dignity clause is complex and packs a number of related
rights concepts into three short sentences. Exploring the history of these concepts and
how they came to be expressed in the Montana constitution greatly contributes to our
understanding of state constitutionalism.1
The clause itself—section 4, Article II of the 1972 Montana Constitution—reads:
Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state
nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas.2
This brief paragraph reflects three intricate concepts about individual rights and
the role of government: a notion of human dignity that cannot be violated; a

1

Larry M. Elison and Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 10.
2
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guarantee of equal protection under the law; and a protection from discrimination
based on a variety of characteristics, which is extended to discrimination by both
governmental and private actors. These concepts reflect several of the emerging
rights that scholars of constitutional revision had identified as areas where new
state constitutions could offer stronger guarantees than the federal Constitution.
This chapter explores the history of these concepts at the federal and state level
and then recounts the process by which they became incorporated into the
Montana constitution.3
In many respects the Montana dignity clause encapsulates the decades of legal
developments brought on by two major social and political movements: the civil rights
movement and the women’s movement. These movements sparked interconnected legal
changes based largely on the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause as well as
new laws and interpretations based on the concept of non-discrimination. These
developments first took place in response to the civil rights movement, which forced a
radical change in the interpretation and application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause.4
As discussed in chapter one, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was
severely limited following the Civil War. In addition to the attempts to use the privileges
and immunities clause to apply the protections contained in the Bill of Rights to the
3
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states, activists seeking to address both racial and gender discrimination challenged
discriminatory laws and practices under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s early interpretations of the equal
protection clause limited its use in two ways. The first was the acceptance of the
“separate yet equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). In this notorious nineteenth
century decision, the Court upheld a Louisiana law requiring black and white rail
passengers to ride in separate cars, thus paving the way for unfettered racial segregation
laws and practices throughout much of the United States. This interpretation greatly
limited the equal protection clause as a tool to end discriminatory practices.6
The second way the Court limited the equal protection clause’s scope was
through its definition of state action. The phrase “no state” precedes the language of the
equal protection clause: “shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court ruled that the
clause only protected individuals from state, as opposed to private, discrimination; this is
known as the “state action” doctrine, which is the first step in determining whether the
equal protection clause has been violated. In the Supreme Court’s first ruling defining
“state action,” it held in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) that state action meant only acts by
5
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a state’s legislature, its executive branch, or its upper-level courts. Applying this narrow
concept of state action in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court overturned the first civil rights
law, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibited discrimination in public
accommodations. The Court struck down the law on the premise that discrimination in
public accommodations (for example, denying service in a restaurant or inn) was private
rather than state action and therefore beyond the scope of Congress’ power to ameliorate
under the Fourteenth Amendment.7
The combination of this narrow definition of state action and the overturning of
the major civil rights legislation of the period severely limited the ability of individuals to
use the equal protection clause to challenge discrimination by lower-level state
employees, private actors, or other agents. In addition, with the end of Reconstruction
and the absence of a legislative will to address civil rights, laws and practices segregating
and discriminating against African-Americans flourished. Discriminatory practices by the
states even received the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court on several occasions. Those
seeking to combat racial segregation and discrimination following the Civil Rights Cases
and Plessy were left with little or no legal recourse.8
During this same era, the Court also heard challenges from women’s rights
activists alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some of the women made
claims under the equal protection clause. Women had been treated differently than men
7
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under the law in the United States since its inception as a country. This unequal treatment
of women and men in the law included such practices as the legal doctrine of coverture,
which posited that women were not independent legal entities from their husbands, or in
some cases, fathers. As a result married, and some single, women were prohibited from
making contracts, entering into business arrangements, or maintaining legal control of
their financial assets. Additionally, women were often treated differently in criminal
cases, prohibited from voting, denied the right to hold elected office, not allowed to serve
on juries, and in many cases barred from entering specific professions. Women’s rights
activists, many of whom had been intimately involved with the abolitionist movement,
unsuccessfully attempted to convince Congress to explicitly include women in the
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. Refusing to admit
failure, they subsequently challenged discriminatory laws hoping that the courts would
apply the amendments’ protections to women.9
In the case of Bradwell v. Illinois (1873), Myra Bradwell challenged the denial of
her admission to the Illinois state bar as a violation of the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradwell had been denied admission simply
because she was a woman, despite the fact that she passed the bar exam and edited and
published a highly respected legal journal. In what would appear to the modern reader as
highly inflammatory and stereotypically gendered language, the Court summarily
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dismissed her claims and reaffirmed the narrow reading of the privileges and immunities
clause that had recently been announced in the Slaughterhouse Case.10
The Court also rejected a claim in Minor v. Happersett (1875), brought by
leaders active in the Seneca Falls convention, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee that all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens meant
that American women were citizens and thus guaranteed the right to vote. The Court held
that suffrage was not an automatic right of citizenship and that the framers of the
Amendment would have explicitly stated their intention to extend suffrage to women if
they had intended to do so. As a result of the Court’s refusal to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to women and women’s lack of political power, the women’s movement
focused almost solely on the campaign for suffrage until the 1920s.11
These cases limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment for decades. It took
concerted legal campaigns, linked directly to the civil rights and women’s rights
movements, to change the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular,
given the evisceration of the privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, activists in the twentieth century focused their efforts on the equal protection
clause. The civil rights movement began to see small successes in the 1930s, but
significant change in equal protection and non-discrimination law was largely ushered in
during the Warren court era. The decisions of that court radically changed legal concepts
of equal protection and discrimination and had an immense impact on American political
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culture and, to our interest here, on specific individual delegates to the Montana
Constitutional Convention.12
Two major shifts in interpretation resulted in a more expansive application of the
equal protection clause: the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the separate-but-equal
doctrine and its broadening of the definition of state action. These changes were directly
related to the efforts of the civil rights movement. The abandonment of the separate-butequal doctrine was the result of a legal strategy designed to combat the racial
discrimination and segregation that was rampant in the Jim Crow South and common
throughout the United States. This strategy was originally developed by the lead attorney
for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Charles
Hamilton Houston, and carried on to fruition by Thurgood Marshall, a future member of
the Warren court. The NAACP strategy focused primarily on educational facilities and
began not by attacking the reigning legal interpretation of separate-but-equal, but by
arguing that specific separate educational opportunities for African Americans were not
equal to those for whites. The success of this strategy led to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions ruling that a state’s offer to send an African American student to law school
out-of-state was not equal to the educational opportunity provided white law students instate; that a separate law school created specifically for African Americans in Texas was
not an equal educational opportunity because its prestige, library, and faculty were
12
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substantially inferior to those provided white students at the University of Texas Law
School; and that admitting an African American to the same graduate program as white
students, but forcing him to be partitioned off from the rest of the class, was not equal
treatment.13
This gradual attack on segregation in higher education led to the landmark case
of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which prohibited racial segregation in
elementary and secondary schools. The Court found that segregated educational facilities
were “inherently” unequal and thus a violation of the equal protection clause. This case,
and the Court’s decision to assign oversight of the implementation of school
desegregation to federal district courts in Brown II (1955), initiated battles across the
country over desegregation, most famously in the heavily segregated South. In a series of
cases throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Warren Court consistently, and unanimously,
rejected attempts by states to avoid desegregation and definitively rejected the separatebut-equal doctrine that had marked equal protection law for nearly sixty years. Despite
the Court’s consistent position, school desegregation took decades to be implemented; by
the 1970s, the focus had shifted to northern schools and the role of busing to accomplish
desegregation, making school desegregation still an important and controversial issue at
the time of the Montana Constitutional Convention.14
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The second major change to the way the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the equal
protection clause was that it adopted a broader view of state action. Whereas the Court
had ruled in 1883 that state action was limited to laws and the actions of the state
legislature, judiciary, and executive, beginning in the 1940s the Court expanded the
actions which could trigger the guarantees of the equal protection clause. By the 1960s
the Court had determined that state discriminatory action included political parties when
their primaries were closed to African Americans and neighborhood associations that
created covenants prohibiting the sale of homes to African Americans (because the
enforcement of these covenants relied on state judicial action). In a major case that
demonstrated how broadly it now viewed the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court
held that the refusal of a privately owned coffee shop to serve African Americans was
state action, because it leased space owned by the city. These cases reflected a
willingness of the Court to apply the equal protection clause in instances where the state
was not the primary discriminator, but merely related to the enforcement of the
discrimination. Consequently, many attorneys and much of the general public began to
view multiple forms of quasi-public discrimination as violating the concept of equal
protection. At least some of the delegates to the Montana Constitutional Convention,
many of whom were attorneys educated in the 1950s and 1960s, certainly shared these
conceptions.15
15
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Racial discrimination was not, of course, limited to the actions of the government
or private party actions that could be enforced by the government. Perhaps the most
intractable forms of discrimination were those practiced by private individuals or
organizations. Because the Fourteenth Amendment only protected individuals from
“state” action, the Supreme Court could not prohibit these forms of discrimination under
the equal protection clause. The civil rights movement and Congress therefore looked
elsewhere for the authority to prohibit private discrimination. Their actions highlighted
the pervasiveness of private discrimination and the importance of ending it, and bred
popular familiarity with laws and legal concepts that sought to do so. Congress
progressively became more willing to limit discrimination, and following the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, passed the groundbreaking Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or sex in
employment and in public accommodations, such as hotels or restaurants. Fortunately for
those who sought to end racial discrimination, the Supreme Court had, during the New
Deal era, broadly expanded the meaning of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Consequently, instead of legislating under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress relied
on their power to regulate interstate commerce to pass this act. Continuing its broad
reading of the clause, the Court upheld the law in two key cases: Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. U.S. (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung (1964). Emboldened by the Court’s
affirmation of the act, Congress passed a series of laws addressing discrimination,
including the Equal Pay Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Housing Rights Act.
Collectively, these laws severely limited the legality of private discrimination.16
16
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This national focus on discrimination and the civil rights movement was
transmitted to Montana through television, newspapers, and local connections to national
organizations and key individuals. Indeed, for a state lacking in racial diversity, Montana
played a significant role in the adoption of the Civil Rights Act and other civil rights
legislation through their wildly-popular senior senator and U. S. Senate Majority Leader,
Mike Mansfield. Senator Mansfield was central to developing the legislative strategy that
led to the Civil Rights Act’s adoption; despite his willingness to give others credit, he
was considered by numerous senators to be key to its passage. This involvement with
civil rights legislation appeared to be embraced by Montanans: Mansfield “coasted to reelection” in 1964 with 65% of the vote. The important role of this popular Montanan in
the adoption of the civil rights act likely made the issue more prominent and important
than it might have been otherwise in such a predominantly white northwestern state. 17
Because Congress included sex as a prohibited category for discrimination in the
Civil Rights Act, in the 1960s the courts began to apply equal protection and nondiscrimination guarantees to women. While the Supreme Court had stalled the attempts
of women’s rights organizations to apply any part of the Fourteenth Amendment to
women in the late 1800s, these activists had not given up on achieving equal legal status
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for women. The movement’s focus at the turn of the twentieth century was on gaining the
right to vote, which was accomplished in many states during the first two decades of the
1900s and nationally through the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in
1920. Other forms of legal equality—serving on juries, equal employment opportunities,
equal inheritance rights, access to public benefits, and others—were still elusive. Despite
the continual efforts of women’s rights activists, the concept of treating women equally
under the law was controversial well into the 1960s. For example, opponents of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 added protection against sex discrimination because they thought
extending protections against discrimination based on sex would guarantee the bill’s
failure.18
Whereas the major statutory protections against discrimination based on race
came after the major constitutional rulings, such as Brown v. Board of Education,
discrimination based on gender was first prohibited by many of the same statutory
protections—the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act—prior to being perceived as a
constitutional right. Women’s rights activists had long sought a constitutional prohibition
of discrimination based on sex by advocating for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
The ERA was initially introduced in Congress in 1923 and a reintroduced each session
until its passage. Passage of the ERA would have added an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which read: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.” As the delegates to the
18
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Montana Constitutional Convention prepared to draft a new constitution, the ERA was
working its way through Congress; however, it was not voted on by Congress until after
Montana had drafted its new constitution in 1972.19 Parallel to the campaign for the ERA
were changes in the way the U.S. Supreme Court applied equal protection concepts to
discrimination based on gender. The first U.S. Supreme Court decision to extend equal
protection to women was decided in November of 1971, just months before the ERA
passed Congress and before the Montana Constitutional Convention convened. This case,
Reed v. Reed, involved an Idaho law that gave preference to males over females in the
administration of estates. The Reed’s son had passed away, the couple had separated and
both sought to be named the executor of their son’s estate. The Idaho law stated that men
were automatically given preference when it came to appointing an executor to an estate;
therefore the probate court appointed Mr. Reed. Mrs. Reed challenged the law and argued
that it was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since
this was a case of sex discrimination, the state simply had to prove the discriminatory law
served a “rational purpose.”20 Even under this permissive test, the Supreme Court
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determined that the law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For the first time, women were protected against discrimination by the U.S.
Constitution. Combined with the drastic changes in the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to racial discrimination, the extension of equal protection guarantees to
women greatly expanded the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. This expansion of the
Fourteenth Amendment was very recent when the Montana Constitutional Convention
met, and like many states, Montana had not yet replicated these advances in federal law.21
The short history of equal protection and non-discrimination law in Montana
highlights the extent to which these were emerging rights at the time of the constitutional
convention. Before the new constitution, Montana did have some equal protection and
non-discrimination guarantees; however, these were mostly statutory provisions. The
constitutional protections that did exist mostly reflect the concerns of the late 1880s and
had rarely, if ever, been enforced in court. The 1889 Constitution contained four
provisions addressing issues related to equal protection and non-discrimination:
Article III, Section 3:
All people are born equally free and have certain natural, essential, and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness in all lawful
ways.
Article III, Section 25:
Aliens and denizens shall have the same right as citizens to acquire, purchase,
possess, enjoy, convey, transmit, and inherit mines and mining property, and
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Abraham & Perry, Freedom and The Court,
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21
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milling, reduction, concentrating, and other works, and real property treating ores
and minerals: provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
infringe upon the authority of the United States to provide for the sale or
disposition of its mineral and other public lands.22
Article III, Section 28:
There shall never be in this state either slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Article VII, Section 9:
No religious or partisan test or qualification shall ever be required
of any person as a condition of admission into any public educational
institution of the state, either as teacher or student; nor shall attendance
be required at any religious service whatever, nor shall any sectarian
tenets be taught in any public educational institution of the state; nor shall
any person be debarred admission to any of the collegiate departments of
the university on account of sex.23
In addition to these constitutional guarantees, in 1965 Montana had adopted a public
accommodations law, based on the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made it
illegal if “any place of public accommodation or amusement shall discriminate against
any person or group of persons solely on the ground of race, color or creed.” The same
22
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year Montana also adopted a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, creed,
color, sex and national origin” in the exercise of one’s civil rights. This was not,
however, a particularly active area for litigation in Montana.24
Despite the minimal history of equal protection and non-discrimination law in
Montana, the delegates to the convention were fully cognizant of the recent federal
changes. Many were also influenced by, or participated in, the women’s rights and civil
rights movements. Indeed, the civil rights legislation and the Supreme Court decisions
regarding race issued throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s had an immense
impact on the Montana convention. This is evident in the fact that nineteen women had
been elected to the convention, many of whom had long been active in women’s political
organizations such as the League of Women Voters. At a minimum, the twenty-four
attorneys who served as delegates to the convention were well-versed in recent legal
developments regarding equal protection and non-discrimination. The rest of the
convention had access to and were familiar with Applegate’s Bill of Rights report. His
work summarized the above discussion in some detail, laid out contemporary areas of
concern, and provided examples of other states’ constitutional provisions regarding equal
protection and non-discrimination. The earliest meetings of the BOR Committee where
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they reviewed this report included discussion of equal protection and non-discrimination
issues.25
Applegate’s report included information on the history of equal protection and
non-discrimination laws, the sea-changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution, and possible ways to expand these protections in Montana. Perhaps more
than in any other area of Applegate’s Bill of Rights, the changing philosophy of the
Supreme Court and the political shift evidenced by Richard Nixon’s administration were
used as reasons to adopt strong equal protection and non-discrimination clauses in the
Montana constitution. Applegate criticized the federal enforcement of non-discrimination
statutes as ineffective. He placed the “principal blame” for failure to eradicate
discrimination “at the doorstep of the Nixon Administration.” Applegate also identified
other state provisions—particularly those from New York, Michigan, Illinois, as well as
Puerto Rico—as potential models for stronger equal protection and non-discrimination
guarantees. Illinois’s clause was highlighted in particular for its breadth; the clause
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or sex in both civil rights and
housing and other public accommodations. Applegate ended the section with an
explanation for why Montana should adopt such protections:
25
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Montana, with a significant and, culturally speaking, priceless minority
population, is especially suited to the adoption of strong anti-discrimination
provisions enforceable by those affected. This is even more the case given the
increasing cultural awareness and pride of minorities within the state, as well as
the legitimate concerns of emerging women's rights groups.26

The BOR committee apparently agreed. They placed a heavy emphasis on the
concepts of equal protection, human dignity, and protection from discrimination from the
beginning. Moreover, this interest was not driven by one or two delegates. While most of
the clauses in the declaration of rights grew out of one or two proposals, six separate
proposals were introduced by convention delegates and considered by the BOR
Committee that addressed the principles of human dignity, equal protection, and nondiscrimination. All six of the proposals were introduced in the first few days of the
convention, the BOR committee received extensive public testimony and support for such
a provision, and there was an absence of controversy among the delegates over the
adoption of such a clause.
A number of delegates—some of them members of the BOR committee—along
with the committee staff person, were largely responsible for the creation, passage, and
defense of the right to individual dignity: Bob Campbell, who had been so instrumental in
the privacy fight; Wade Dahood, BOR committee chair and delegate from Anaconda;
Dorothy Eck, BOR committee member delegate from Bozeman; Richard Champoux,
delegate from Kalispell; Mae Nan Robinson, delegate from Missoula; Virginia Blend,
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delegate from Great Falls; and Applegate, the research analyst and author of the
background material for the delegates on the bill of rights.27
Equal protection, non-discrimination, and dignity proposals came pouring in as
soon as the convention convened in January of 1972. Campbell, who pointed to his “love
of constitutional law and the social changes created by the new Warren Court” as the
impetus for his becoming a lawyer, was just as interested in the issues of equal rights as
he was in securing individual privacy rights. His initial proposal on privacy, DP #14,
included a right to privacy, expression, and individual dignity. When it was divided into
three concepts by the style and drafting committee (privacy, expression, and dignity), the
first two eventually became distinct proposals. Campbell has stated that felt his dignity
proposal was already addressed by a proposal submitted January 21, 1972 by Virginia
Blend, a delegate from Great Falls, an active member of the Catholic Church, and a
leader in the League of Women Voters. As a result, he said that he did not write another
proposal for individual dignity.28
Blend’s proposal, DP #10, consisted of a straightforward statement: “Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Montana on account of
sex.” This statement mirrored the national Equal Rights Amendment, which was under
consideration by Congress at the time of the Convention. Indeed, Blend’s introduction of
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the proposal and testimony in support of it before the BOR Committee was, in effect,
testimony in support of the ERA. She posited that its adoption would “eliminate time
spent by our state legislature on the subject when the amendment is passed by the Senate
and presented for ratification.” Her argument centered on the role the federal ERA would
have in “creating a new basis for the U.S. Supreme Court” to rule on discrimination and
equal protection cases. Despite widespread support for this simple proposal, it would not
be the format by which these concepts were incorporated into the Montana Constitution.
Competing proposals and public support for more extensive protections and guarantees
ultimately doomed Blend’s simple proposal.29
At least three other delegates proposed alternative forms of equal protection and
non-discrimination clauses. On January 28, 1972, Campbell submitted a proposal, DP
#50, that closely mirrored the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause: “The
equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged by the state or its units of
local government on account of race, color, creed, national ancestry or sex.” This
language closely reflected that proposed in a petition that numerous Missoulians sent to
Campbell and the BOR Committee. However, there was one key change. The petition
included a statement that said, “We do not want the words ‘by the government’ inserted
in this statement because such a phrase would limit the prohibition to the government and
its bodies and agencies and may serve to exclude from the prohibition such private
agencies as businesses and educational institutions.” The petitioners were advocating for
a constitutional provision that would protect individuals from private discrimination.
This concept had been discussed among constitutional revision advocates in other states,
29
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but was not commonly included in other state constitutions. For example, the New York
Committee for Economic Development had floated the idea of protecting rights against
private parties in a proposal for the 1967 New York constitution.30
This petition was not the only public input Campbell received regarding equal
rights. In fact, at a public meeting before the convention chaired by Campbell, the
Missoula delegates accepted proposals for various equal protection/non-discrimination
provisions from the American Association of University Women, the Montana
Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Women’s Club of Missoula, the Missoula Business
and Professional Women’s Club, the Missoula Soroptomist Club, and individual citizens.
Campbell responded to public calls for a non-discrimination provision and wrote a
proposal that reflected their support for a clause including sex as a protected class. He
combined this concept with his knowledge of the existing Warren court standards for
protecting individuals from discrimination based on race, color, national ancestry, or
religious belief. However, his proposal did not offer the far-reaching protections some
citizens had called for. To address these concerns regarding private discrimination, on
January 28, 1972, Campbell proposed a clause, DP #51, prohibiting discrimination in
housing and employment, in effect elevating the existing public accommodations statute
to a constitutional protection. This proposal stated:
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All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, national ancestry or sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property. These rights are enforceable without
action by the legislature but the legislature may provide additional remedies for
their violation.31
Other delegates offered similar ideas. However, their proposals combined equal
protection guarantees with protections from private and public discrimination; their
provisions, in other words, went far beyond those offered by Blend and Campbell. The
youngest and the oldest delegates, Mae Nan Robinson, a young graduate student who had
recently lost her husband in Vietnam, and Lucile Speer, a retired librarian who had been
active in the 1968 Eugene McCarthy presidential campaign, paired up to submit proposal
DP #32, which provided that:
No person shall, because of race, color, national origin, creed, religion, or sex be
subjected to any public or private discrimination in political and civil rights, in the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer, or in the sale or rental of
property. These rights shall be enforceable without action by the legislative
assembly. Persons aggrieved shall have access to the Courts to enjoin
discrimination prohibited by this section.
This proposal introduced the concept of prohibiting private discrimination, in much the
same way as the federal Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Housing Act, and
state public accommodations law had done. In addition, it satisfied the Missoula
petitioners’ call for an equal protection provision that prohibited both private and public
discrimination. The last two lines of the proposal reflected a fear, later expressed by
Robinson on the floor of the convention during the debate on the dignity clause, that the
legislature could not be trusted with the power of implementing and enforcing provisions
31
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in the declaration of rights. This fear, along with the view of the courts as the appropriate
avenue for protection of one’s rights, reflected the recent national history of the civil
rights movement as well as a long-standing belief among the political left in Montana that
the legislature was not an independent body but one that was controlled by and acted in
furtherance of special interests. As attorney Wade Dahood, chair of the BOR Committee,
explained on the floor of the convention, individuals would, of course, have access to the
courts to enforce the rights guaranteed in the constitution without a specific statement on
the matter.32
The last delegate proposal on the topic, DP #61, happened to combine the various
different components. It read:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the law, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of his civil or
political rights or in the choice of housing or conditions of employment on
account of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or
religious ideas, by any person, firm, corporation, or institution; or by the state or
any agency or subdivision of the state.
This language is very close to that which was finally adopted by the committee and the
full convention. The proposal was introduced by five delegates: Richard Champoux, a
Democrat from Kalispell and a professor; William Burkhardt, a Republican from Helena
and a minister; Marshall Murray, a Republican from Kalispell, a member of the BOR
32
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Committee, and an attorney; J. Mason Melvin, a Democrat from Bozeman and a retired
FBI agent; and Jerome Cate, a Democrat delegate from Billings and an attorney. This
diverse group of sponsors hints at why the proposal was supported so widely. The group
represented significant diversity in geographical representation, partisan affiliation, and
employment and experience. Combined with the proposals of Blend, Campbell,
Robinson, and Speer, the Champoux proposal also reflected widespread support from
delegates from all the major urban centers in the state. Additionally, the non-partisan
nature of the convention is clearly exhibited in their joint proposal, which brought
together both delegates of different parties and delegates that represent communities with
differing bases of political party power.33
The BOR Committee unanimously approved the Champoux proposal on February
9, 1972. This proposal went far beyond any existing federal protections on equal
protection and non-discrimination. While there was federal law prohibiting private
discrimination, given the state action doctrine, these protections were certainly not
constitutionally guaranteed. Additionally, the Court had barely begun to apply the equal
protection clause to women, with the first such case having been decided mere months
before the convention. The prevalence of proposals that pushed these legal boundaries
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and the diverse interest in equal rights guarantees illustrate the strong interest of the
convention in writing a constitution that went beyond the federal Constitution’s
protections for individual rights. It also illustrates the great influence of era-specific
concepts of fundamental rights.34
The committee received a significant amount of correspondence and testimony
regarding equal protection and non-discrimination. For the most part, the public’s input
was aimed at the general concepts and not at various specific proposals. This testimony
fell into three major categories: testimony on the concept of an equal rights amendment
prohibiting public discrimination based on numerous categories such as sex, race, color,
and religion; testimony about private discrimination; and American Indian rights.
Most of the public’s testimony fell into the first category and many of those who testified
or wrote their delegates had some connection to the League of Women Voters, the
American Association of University Women (AAUW), or some other organization
working on women’s rights issues. On January 24, 1972 the Missoula branch of the
AAUW wrote the committee to voice their support for an ERA-style proposal. Bonnie
Wallem of the League of Women Voters testified on January 27 1972 that her
organization also supported such a proposal. Testifying on her own behalf, Evelyn
Schallaire addressed the disparity between men and women in inheritance laws in
Montana and asked for a constitutional remedy. Writing on behalf of the Bozeman branch
of the AAUW, Margaret Hauser wrote Dorothy Eck calling for a proposal which stated
that “equal rights shall not be denied on account of race, color, creed, sex, or national
origin.” Hauser said that she recognized that adopting such a clause would place Montana
34
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ahead of the federal and many state governments. The constitutional convention, Hauser
added, gave Montana “the opportunity to provide enlightened leadership in an area that is
very important to women as well as to minorities.” At least five women testified on
January 29, 1972 in support of an equal rights proposal. One of them, Bess Reed, noted
the importance of having equal protection clauses in state constitutions regardless of the
protections contained in the federal Constitution.35
In addition to the Missoula petition calling for protection against private
discrimination, the committee received testimony requesting inclusion of such protections
in the constitution. On January 29, 1972 Sidney Smith, the Commissioner of the
Department of Labor and Industry, called for the convention to elevate the existing
employment discrimination laws to the level of a constitutional guarantee. In particular,
he recommended prohibiting discrimination based on sex. On February 15, the committee
received a statement from the Resolution Committee of the Montana Association of
Social Workers that addressed the dangers of housing and employment discrimination.
Such actions and other forms of human rights violations, the Resolution Committee
stated, “infringe on the basic human right to a life with dignity.” They urged the
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committee to, at a minimum, include a provision against private discrimination in the
constitution.36
Indian rights also garnered significant testimony; roughly one-tenth of the
witnesses testifying before the Committee spoke to the need for Indian rights to be
protected. The committee formed a subcommittee to discuss Indian rights, likely because
most of the testimony was actually focused on Indian education and access to education.
In the subcommittee’s report, Leo Graybill commented that including culture in the equal
protection clause could be “reverse discrimination.” This suggests that the concept of
equal protection was embraced in the abstract, but in practice, there was lingering racism.
After receiving testimony and the subcommittee’s report the committee amended the
Champoux proposal to address the concerns raised by the testimony from Indian rights
advocates. Graybill was in the minority and as a result, the committee inserted the word
“culture” as one of the characteristics for which people would be protected from
discrimination. The Committee report states that the “word culture was incorporated
specifically to cover groups whose cultural base is distinct from mainstream Montana,
especially the American Indians.” The final language of the dignity clause demonstrated
that the committee was willing to respond to the concerns of the members of the public,
who went out of their way to testify or contact the Committee. This incorporation
reflected the ways in which the national civil rights movement was specifically applied
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and viewed in Montana. The concepts of discrimination were most relevant when
applied to Native Americans in a state with a very small minority population.37
The final difference in the language between the Champoux proposal and the one
that was forwarded out of the BOR Committee (which is identical to the adopted clause)
is the phrase “conditions of employment.” The deletion of that phrase reflected the
testimony of the Montana State AFL-CIO in front of the BOR Committee on February
16, 1972. The AFL-CIO stated that they were concerned that this phrase could be used to
prohibit closed-shop unions, places of employment where membership in a union is
required for continued employment. Throughout the convention there were proposals, led
in part by the Montana Chamber of Commerce, to include a right-to-work provision in
the constitution, which would have prohibited closed-shop unions. All right-to-work
provisions failed, and following the suggestion of the AFL-CIO, the BOR Committee
stripped the phrase “conditions of employment” from the Champoux proposal.38

37

Verbatim Transcript, Bill of Rights Committee Report, 2:615 – 660; Minutes of the Seventh
Meeting of the Bill of Rights Committee; Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Bill of Rights Committee;
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Bill of Rights Committee, List of Individuals Testifying, January 26,
1972. While the amendment of the dignity clause shows some focus on American Indian rights, the vast
majority of the Indian testimony and activism during the convention was focused on promoting provisions
regarding Indian education and cultural competency. This is in large part due to the leadership of Earl
Barlow, the state supervisor of Indian education. His focus on education drove much of the Indian activism
toward those goals. His papers are held at the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library at the University of
Montana and provide extensive documentation on Indian activism in regards to education during the 1960s
and 1970s. Earl Barlow Papers, MSS 709, Mike and Maureen Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
38
Montana Constitutional Convention, “Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Bill of Rights
Committee,” AFL-CIO Testimony, February 16, 1972, Folder 2-37, Box 2, RG 22, MHSL; Verbatim
Transcript, Bill of Rights Committee Report, 2:615 – 660. Scholars have not yet explored the history of the
constitutional convention’s battle over the right-to-work issue. For more on the convention’s debate on the
right-to-work proposal see, John Kuglin, “Billings Man to Introduce Right-to-Work Provision,”
Missoulian, January 29, 1972, Brown Collection, 16; John Kuglin, “Con Con Flexes Subpoena Powers,”
Great Falls Tribune, February 4, 1972, Brown Collection, 44; Associated Press, “Con Con Debates Rightto-Work Plan,” Helena Independent Record, February 4, 1972, Brown Collection, 45; Editorial,
“Constitution Should Not Be Against or For Labor,” Billings Gazette, February 10, 1972, Brown
Collection, 58; Associated Press, “Right-to-Work Stand by C of C [Chamber of Commerce] Taken to

124

The full convention began discussion on the dignity clause on March 9, 1972. The
proposal was the subject of remarkably little debate. Mae Nan Robinson, unfamiliar with
the legal system and the basics of constitutional interpretation, restated her concerns that
the clause lacked a statement specifically authorizing individuals to seek redress from the
courts in case of discrimination. Her concerns were addressed by the BOR Committee
chair and attorney, Wade Dahood. The only other concern regarded the phrase protecting
individuals from private discrimination. Otto Habendank of Sidney worried that the
provision would apply to membership requirements for private organizations, such as a
group he belonged to, the Sons of Norway. He made a motion to strike the language
extending protection to private entities. Echoing the reasoning in a recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Moose Lodge v. Irvis (1971), Dahood stated that it was not the intent of
the committee to forbid membership requirements for entirely private groups. The intent,
he argued, was to proscribe powerful private interests from preventing access to
employment, housing, and other public accommodations. Perhaps given Montana’s longstanding distrust of corporations and the intimate knowledge of the power of large private
interests such as the Anaconda Company, this argument resonated with the convention
delegates. The proposed amendment failed 13 to 76, and the clause passed on a voice
vote with no discernable opposition.39
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With the adoption of the dignity clause, Montana embraced the “most inclusive
scheme of ‘equal rights’ of any known constitution.” The fact that federal equal
protection and non-discrimination law was so fresh suggests that Montanans were not
satisfied to follow federal standards; they were willing to go beyond them and set higher
ones for individual rights. With the inclusion of new protected classes and protection
against private interests, this was indeed a radical provision. This clause alone provided a
strong legal basis for the development of state-specific approaches to equal protection
and discrimination law. Because of its great potential and its clear difference from federal
law, this clause is an important key to understanding how those engaged in state
constitutional revision set the stage for the future state constitutionalism movement. The
dignity clause illustrates that many citizens, attorneys, and lawmakers were thinking
about ways to protect individual rights at the state level long before state courts
determined to take their own steps toward the expansion of individual rights. 40
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Conclusion
The Montana Constitutional Convention occurred during an extraordinary period
of time for the state and the nation. As historian Oliver Zunz has argued, at the dawn of
the 1970s America had recently completed massive societal overalls of two major areas.
First, the country had created a national, mass-market based economy; and second,
Americans had acquired expanded access to their democratic institutions in a pluralistic
fashion. A massive conservative backlash to these changes was brewing, but in 1972 in
Montana citizens came together to craft a constitution that embodied many of the
principles and institutional shifts of the mid-twentieth century. Despite its progressivism,
the constitution cannot be dismissed as solely a liberal document. The wife of the former
Republican governor, a Republican herself, Betty Babcock, was widely recognized as one
of the leaders of the convention and one of the most vocal proponents of the
constitution’s passage. Republican J.C. Garlington stated that he believed Republican
delegates had made “the larger contributions of personal interest and effectiveness in the
whole effort.” He viewed the new document as an opportunity for Republicans to lead
Montana into the future.1
When the convention delegates signed the constitution on March 24, 1972, they
offered up to the Montana people a document that reflected this optimism and the recent
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social and cultural changes. It radically altered the system of governance in Montana in
numerous ways, many of which were controversial. The 1972 constitution changed the
structure of local government by allowing for home-rule charters, revamped the judicial
system by ending the existing office of Justice of the Peace, strengthened the power of
the executive and legislative branches by giving them more flexibility in budget making
and execution, and greatly expanded the role of the state in protecting the environment.
The newly expanded Declaration of Rights was just one small part of these immense
changes. Faced with the potential for an entirely new and different system of government,
many Montanans balked. This discomfort with the vast changes contained in the
constitution was expressed in Mrs. Joe Field’s admonition to the delegates: “When we
voted [for the constitutional convention] it was not to tear it all apart, just update a few
things.” This statement reflected the analysis of some in the news media who described
the convention as divided between those who wanted moderate change and those who
wanted radical change.2
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(hereafter cited as, “Speer Papers, MSS 585, UMML”); Robert E. Sullivan to Lucile Speer, January 24,
1972, MSS 585, Box 6, Folder 1, UMML; Mrs. Joe Field to Lucile Speer and All Convention Delegates, no
date, MSS 585, Box 6, Folder 2, UMML; Dennis E. Curran, “The Unbelievable Happened,” Billings
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Library, accessed online at
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The two-month campaign leading up to the ratification vote was hard-fought. The
Farm Bureau and a handful of individuals led the opposition to the constitution.
Supporters of the document included the Montana Sheriffs and Peace Officers
Association, Montana Common Cause, the Montana League of Women Voters, the
Montana American Civil Liberties Union, the Anaconda and Great Falls Chamber of
Commerce, and the Montana AFL-CIO. Delegates reported that the most commonly
asserted concerns from the public had to do with school financing and taxation. Indeed,
an anonymous opposition pamphlet highlighted new taxation powers, expanded
legislative and executive powers, and water rights as some of its biggest concerns with
the proposed document. The only mention of the Declaration of Rights the author has
identified in opposition materials was a clearly erroneous statement that there was no bill
of rights included in the constitution. Some of the most controversial aspects of the
document were separated out to be voted on alone, including a proposal to abolish the
death penalty and move to a unicameral legislature; both proposals were rejected by
voters. In the end, the advocates for change won and the proposed constitution was
ratified by Montana voters on June 6, 1972 by a narrow margin of just 2,532 votes,
potentially attributable to public discomfort with such whole-scale change.3
The Montana constitution has been re-affirmed by voters twice, in 1990 and 2010.
Contained within this document is a strong statement of protection for individual rights
3

Michael P. Malone, Richard B. Roeder, and William L. Lang, Montana: a History of Two
Centuries, revised ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), 394 – 395;Voter Education
Committee to Delegates, April 24, 1972, Roeder Collection, Jameson Law Library, University of MontanaMissoula; “Organizations Which Have Endorsed the Proposed Constitution,” May 17, 1972, Roeder
Collection,; “Concerning the Constitutional Convention: Did You Know?” no date but prior to June 6,
1972, Roeder Collection; J.C. Garlington Response to Anonymous Pamphlet, May 12, 1972, Roeder
Collection; Jon Bennion, Big Sky Politics: Campaigns and Elections in Modern Montana (Missoula, MT:
Five Valleys Publishing, 2004): 72.
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that appeared to receive near unanimous support from the convention delegates and a
majority of the public. The controversies that did develop at the convention rarely
touched the Bill of Rights Committee. Unlike other committees, they submitted one
majority report. Other committees had at least one, if not multiple, minority reports
expressing disagreement with the majority proposal. This suggests that delegates of many
political persuasions were interested in a strong bill of rights. The protections contained
in the Declaration of Rights have provided civil rights and liberties advocates, attorneys,
and judges in Montana with the legal basis for developing an approach to state
constitutionalism and a body of law regarding individual rights that is independent of the
federal Constitution and often goes beyond its protections. There are multiple areas of the
law where advocates have argued for the courts to apply the Montana constitution,
especially the privacy and dignity clauses, in ways that protect individual rights at a
higher level than the federal Constitution.4
For example, Melissa Harrison and Peter Mickelson have argued that the Montana
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the search and seizure clause has been greatly affected
by the privacy clause. In many ways, the court has ruled that an individual’s privacy must
be given more weight when determining the scope of legal searches and seizures than is
required at the federal level because of the language of the privacy clause. According to
the court: “Montana’s unique constitutional language affords citizens a greater right to
4

A provision in the 1972 constitution requires a periodic vote, every twenty years, on whether to
retain the existing constitution or hold a constitutional convention to revise it. 1972 Montana Constitution,
Article XIV, Section 3. The most controversial topics in the Bill of Rights committee were the debate
regarding whether there would be a privacy exemption to the right to know; Wade Dahood’s insertion of a
clause which would, in effect, overturn a decision in a case he had argued and lost in the state supreme
court on worker’s comp; the failure of the committee to prohibit gun licensing and registration; and the
adoption of a clause guaranteeing Montanans the right to a clean and healthful environment. See, chapter
Three, note 2.
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privacy and therefore broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.” This has resulted
in numerous differences between federal and state search and seizure law, all in favor of
the individual, in areas such as electronic surveillance, the searching of a vehicle, and the
searching of an open field. These protections are directly linked to the intent of the
constitutional convention when it wrote and debated the privacy clause and the search
and seizure clause.5
Another area of law in which Montana has departed from the federal standards
includes regulations affecting same-sex couples. In the 1997 case of Gryczan v. State of
Montana, which challenged the state’s ban on same-sex sexual relations, attorneys for
Linda Gryzcan and her partner, Anne Gehr, called for the law to be overturned as
unconstitutional under both the dignity clause and the privacy clause. The Montana
Supreme Court overturned the law as a violation of the privacy clause. The federal law at
the time was based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick in
which the Court upheld a similar Georgia law despite claims that it violated the
individual’s right to privacy. It was not until 2003 that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
course and struck down so-called sodomy laws across the nation in Lawrence v. Texas.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that such laws violated privacy and the
concept of liberty in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In another
5

Under federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, police do not need to meet the search
and seizure standards applicable to a home in order to perform a search of an open field on private property
that can be viewed from a road or the air, even if it is enclosed by a fence. This is known as the “open
fields” doctrine. In reaching this decision, the Court’s rationale was that individuals do not have an
expectation of privacy on their land, unless they have taken extraordinary measures to block it from aerial
view. The Montana Supreme Court has ruled differently, saying that Montana’s privacy clause provides for
a heightened expectation of privacy that requires police to meet all search and seizure criteria in order to
search fields or open lands that are within view of a road or the air. Melissa Harrison and Peter Mickelson,
“The Evolution of Montana’s Privacy-Enhanced Search and Seizure Analysis: A Return to First
Principles,” Montana Law Review 64 (2003): 245; State v. Ellison, 288 MT 46 (2000).
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case addressing same-sex rights, in 2004 the court ruled in Snetsinger v. Montana
University System that the state violated the equal protection guarantees of the dignity
clause when it refused to extend health insurance and other benefits to the same-sex
domestic partners of university system employees. More recently, in Baxter v. State of
Montana (2009) the Montana Supreme court ruled that the two clauses regarding dignity
and privacy are interrelated and guarantee individuals the right to choose physician
assisted death. In another medical-related case, some have recently argued that reducing
access to medical marijuana violates both the dignity and privacy clauses.6
Scholars have not yet examined the ways Montana’s state constitutionalism cases
have influenced other states. Research on this topic is warranted and would contribute to
both a deeper understanding of state constitutionalism and state constitutional history. It
appears that state constitutionalism has been embraced by state courts across the country
in recent years. Most the cases regarding same-sex marriage have been decided on
independent state grounds. This is an emerging area of law that will contribute to the
scholarship on the topic; Montana currently has a case working its way toward the state
supreme court that asserts that the dignity and privacy clauses demand recognition of
same-sex partnerships. The outcome of this case and its influence on other state
judiciaries will make for an interesting study on the effects of state constitutionalism. 7

6

Baxter v. State of Montana, 2009 MT 449; Charles Johnson, “Montana Says Medical Marijuana
Law is not Unconstitutional,” Missoulian, June 3, 2011; Gryczan v. State of Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (1997);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Snetsinger v.
Montana University System, 104 P.3d 445 (2004); Cassie Coleman, “Love or Confusion: Common Law
Marriage, Homosexuality, and the Montana Supreme Court in Snetsinger v. Montana University System,”
Montana Law Review 66 (2005): 445 – 474.
7
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases 43 Cal.4th 757 (2008); Donaldson v. State of Montana,
Cause No. BDV-2010-702 (April 19, 2011).
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Whether the cases utilizing the dignity and privacy clauses reflected the specific
intentions of the delegates is up for debate. However, they do illustrate the role that state
constitutional revision played in establishing a basis for state constitutionalism in
Montana. While many scholars point to the mid-1970s decisions of judges or articles in
law reviews as the genesis of state constitutionalism, the history of Montana’s
constitutional convention shows that the concept of state constitutionalism was prevalent
much earlier. The delegates read numerous documents, produced as far back as the mid1950s, discussing the concept and proposed multiple provisions for new rights. In
addition, as the gun rights testimony shows, the public was comfortable pushing the
delegates to go further in their protections for individual rights. The literature on state
constitutional revision reflects a strong concern about the state of federalism. That theme
was picked up throughout Applegate’s Bill of Rights document and may explain why
there was a lack of opposition to the Declaration of Rights, even though it contained new
and even radical provisions. Those most vocal in expressing their concerns about the
constitution interlaced problems with the content with worries about strong centralized
government (in particular the federal government) inserting itself into state issues. In a
letter to the editor, Frank Clift expressed worry over rumored federal funding of the
constitutional convention saying the federal government would then “expect to influence
what goes into the new constitution—and that is entirely wrong!” The Citizens for
Constitutional Government, a firmly libertarian-conservative organization, put out a
number of statements, few of which clearly addressed the proposals in front of the
committee. However, the general tenor of their statements expressed a fear of
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government, especially national and international government, and a strong belief in an
inalienable right to liberty. A belief that a strong bill of rights might minimize federal
involvement in the state, could have led individuals like these to accept protections that
may be viewed as “liberal.”8
The concept of adopting rights that went beyond the federal protections was front
and center in the Bill of Rights committee of the Montana Constitutional Convention.
The delegates embraced the legal developments of the day and guaranteed Montanans the
freedom to pursue their life decisions without interference from governmental or
powerful private interests. The resulting constitution and its use to justify state
constitutionalism suggests that more research is needed for scholars to have an accurate
understanding of how and why different states across the nation began to interpret their
constitutions independently of the federal Constitution. In Montana, it is clear that this
phenomenon was directly related to the writing and adoption of a new constitution. The
literature from other states and experts on constitutional revision suggests this may have
been the case nationwide. Montana’s convention suggests that many Americans were
already well aware of Justice Brennan’s 1977 reminder that “State constitutions, too are a
font of individual liberties.” 9

8

Rick Applegate, Bill of Rights, report no. 10 prepared by the Montana Constitutional Convention
Commission for the delegates to the Montana Constitutional Convention, (Helena, Montana, 1971)
(hereafter cited as Applegate, Bill of Rights); Frank Clift, “Letter to the Editor,” no newspaper noted, no
date but clearly post-December 15, 1971 and before the convention began in January, 1972, MSS 585, Box
6, Folder 1, Speer Papers, UMML; Citizens for Constitutional Government “Rights of the Accused,”
Record Group 22, Box 2, Folder 2-4, Constitutional Convention Collection, Montana Historical Society
Archives and Library, Helena, MT (hereafter cited as RG 22, MHSL); Citizens for Constitutional
Government, “Thesis on the Bill of Rights,” RG 22, Box 2, Folder 2-4, MHSL.
9
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,”
Harvard Law Review 90, no. 3 (1977): 489 – 504.
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